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3ABSTRACT
In this dissertation, industrial maintenance activities are researched from a systemic point of
view. Maintenance is considered from the selected viewpoint as a control system for controlling
the reliability of machines in a process environment. The control takes place through
communication of information. Thus, maintenance can also be considered as an information
processing system. Therefore, the viewpoint also supports development of future maintenance
information systems. The specific interest of the research is in modelling the effects of automatic
condition monitoring systems enabled by embedded electronics and software in industrial
machines.
The research problem is to model maintenance systems and the effects of condition
monitoring. Because the focus is on the maintenance systems, the research approach differs from
the usual reliability engineering approaches, which focus on the reliability of mechanical
systems. The applied methods are a literature study of the main reliability paradigms and the
systems theory to derive a theory of maintenance systems. The theory is then applied by
developing a UML knowledge model, an applied Gorry-Morton control activities model, a
stochastic simulation model and a dynamic simulation model of the maintenance systems. Also,
one additional simulation model is developed to study the effect of remote condition monitoring
on the spare parts supply chain.
The main results indicate that the subjective nature of failures, the available information
about the machines as well as the repeatability of the maintenance actions are the most important
factors in the maintenance system control. Also, correct selection of the maintenance system cost
functions is critical in determining the applied maintenance policies.
Condition monitoring increases observability of the states of the machines and therefore
enables more effective maintenance systems with the help of condition-based maintenance.
However, the effectiveness of condition-based maintenance depends on the accuracy of the
monitoring and the coverage of the failure diagnosis. The failure patterns and the repeatability of
the maintenance actions also contribute significantly to the effectiveness of condition-based
maintenance. In spare parts supply chains, remote condition monitoring can be used to stabilise
the supply chain variability and to reduce the supply chain sensitivity to random noise and
sudden changes in the consumption.
Keywords: maintenance system, condition monitoring, condition-based maintenance, supply
chain, information system
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8ABBREVIATIONS, SYMBOLS AND
GLOSSARY
ABBREVIATIONS IN THE TEXT
AI artificial intelligence
CBM condition-based maintenance, a synonym for predictive
maintenance
CE control engineering
CM condition monitoring
CMMS computerised maintenance management system
EOQ economic order quantity
FMEA failure modes and effects analysis
FTA fault tree analysis
MTBM mean operating time between maintenance
MTTAM mean operating time to arrange a maintenance break
MTTF mean operating time to failure of a function or a machine
MTTFR mean calendar time to reach first repaired failure
MTTM mean calendar time to maintain
MTTR mean calendar time to repair
OEE overall equipment efficiency
PM preventive maintenance
RE reliability engineering
RCM / RCM II reliability-centered maintenance
TPM total productive maintenance
TTF operating time to failure
UML unified modelling language
UP unified process
9SYMBOLS AND VARIABLES IN EQUATIONS
α Gamma distribution scale parameter
β Weibull distribution shape parameter
η Weibull distribution scale parameter
λ average failure rate, failure rate
µgroup average failure interval of a group of machines
Ao operational availability
C total number of components
c number of working components
Ci cost of one inspection
Ca actual daily consumption
cco component price
cre repair work costs
cma proactive maintenance costs
cdcap daily lost capacity expenses of proactive maintenance
cdop daily increased operating expenses caused by a failure
cdqu daily increased quality expenses caused by a failure
cdcar daily lost capacity expenses caused by a failure
De estimated daily demand
DC diagnostics coverage
DT failure detection time
E reliability target error
EOQ economic order quantity
fc cost function of maintenance and failures
Gp proportional error gain
Gi integral error gain
K safety factor
n number of proactive maintenance actions in a year
nfd the number of components failed because of deterioration
nfi the number of components failed because of infant failures
nr the number of components being repaired
m number of repairs in a year
mf number of preventive maintenance actions per failure
MTBI mean operating time between inspections
MTBM mean operating time between maintenance, a synonym for MTTF
MTTAM mean operating time to arrange a maintenance break
MTTF mean operating time to failure
MTTFR mean calendar time to reach first repaired failure
MTTM mean calendar time to maintain
MTTR mean calendar time to repair
OEE overall equipment efficiency
OQ order quantity
S reliability target setpoint, system state
T time to failure
Tm time to failure of a maintained system or machine
Td transportation or production delay
TTF operating time to failure
Ut machine utilisation of calendar time
Y controlled reliability variable
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GLOSSARY
asset in the context of industrial maintenance, an asset is physical
property invested for production purposes
availability the probability that at any given instant of time, including or
excluding the proactive maintenance, a machine is not failed
controllability the ability to control the reliability of the machine in order to
achieve and maintain some specific maintenance system efficiency
level1
diagnostics coverage the probability that a failure state is detected correctly by a
diagnostics system, see also observability
failure a state of a machine in which the machine is not performing a
required function at the required level
failure event in this dissertation, an interchangeable term for failure mode
failure mode any event which causes a functional failure
failure pattern a failure rate pattern as a function of operation time
failure state see failure
fault an existence (state) or an occurrence (event) of a failure or a
potential failure
maintenance the combination of all technical and administrative actions,
including supervision actions, intended to retain an entity in, or
restore it to, a state in which it can perform a required function
(IEC 60050-191, 1996)
maintenance policy a decision to apply reactive, preventive or condition-based
maintenance
maintenance program a formal proactive maintenance plan for machines
maintenance strategy a long-term company strategy to use some combination of various
maintenance policies and reliability paradigms
observability the probability that a system state is detected correctly
partial failure partial loss of machine function
planned maintenance maintenance action with planned procedures and resource needs
predictive maintenance a proactive maintenance action triggered by condition monitoring
preventive maintenance a proactive maintenance action executed in order to prevent a
failure
proactive maintenance maintenance action executed before occurrence of an individual
failure
repeatability the probability that any maintenance action of certain action type
results always in the same target system state
reactive maintenance maintenance action executed after occurrence of individual failure
reliability the probability that a machine does not fail during a given time
interval
reliability paradigm a theoretical framework of a scientific school or discipline in
maintenance or reliability
scheduled maintenance time-scheduled proactive maintenance action
total failure total loss of a machine function
unplanned maintenance a proactive or reactive maintenance action with maintenance
procedures and resource needs not planned before executing the
maintenance task
                                                     
1 Note that the definition of controllability differs from the mathematical definition (Wolovich, 2000) in mathematical
control theory.
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1 INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
1.1 MOTIVATION AND BACKGROUND
I have been working with automation and industrial information technology for eight years.
During these years I have been involved in several development projects that aim for automatic
machine condition monitoring (Honkanen, 1997) and machine data communications.
Technically these projects have succeeded: the developed information systems have been
technically modern and worked well. However, despite all the technical advantages these
products have not been commercial successes.
Some years ago I noticed that a good business process consultant can achieve commercially
much more successful results by just capturing the business requirements and doing a thorough
analysis of the business processes before developing anything. I had forgotten that the word
information in the information technology really refers to the substance of an information
system.
An automatic condition monitoring system is essentially such an information system. The
information in the system exists to be processed by humans and computers in order to serve a
purpose. The other technologies that relate to automatic condition monitoring include
applications in automatic machine failure diagnostics, failure prognostics, maintenance planning,
and such future concepts as automatic spare parts orders from intelligent machines. All these
activities interrelate to increase the efficiency of industrial production processes and
maintenance.
The real problem was that I did not know the big picture, I could not find only one such, and
no one could draw me one either, to analyse the effects of automatic condition monitoring on
industrial maintenance activities.
1.2 PROBLEM SETTING AND GOALS OF THE STUDY
Some investment machine manufacturing companies have developed concepts (ABB, 2002;
Metso, 2002) that aim at providing totally integrated information systems. According to their
vision, in the future it will be possible to automate and integrate the maintenance activities in a
system that consists of the machines, persons and information systems. New technologies, such
as electronics, mechatronics, communication and software technologies make it possible to
develop intelligent machines and condition monitoring systems. The problem is how to find the
best application areas for such technologies.
This dissertation proposes that thinking industrial maintenance as an information processing
system leads to a top-down view that helps in analysing the effects of automatic condition
monitoring.
Therefore, the research problem is to model maintenance systems and the effects of automatic
condition monitoring.
The main problem was divided in sub-problems to make the research problem easier to answer.
The three research questions to address the problem can be derived from the systems theory
approach of Saaty and Kearns (1985):
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Q1: What is the purpose of maintenance?
Q2: What are the structures, behaviour and the information flows in the maintenance systems?
Q3: How does condition monitoring affect the systems?
The questions, Q1-Q3, form a logical top-down chain from the purpose of maintenance to the
effects of the condition monitoring to maintenance systems.
1.3 RESEARCH APPROACH, METHODOLOGY AND
DESIGN
The problem is to model maintenance systems and the effects of automatic condition monitoring
on the functions of the maintenance systems. A model of maintenance systems means here some
system model that is not bound to some single maintenance or reliability paradigm, but
applicable to most common paradigms. The systems approach, which studies the relations,
organisation and interactions of entities on an abstract level is proposed to formulate such a
model. Contrasted to analytical approach, which focuses on the parts, the systems approach
focuses on the whole (Schoderbek et al., 1990). This viewpoint emphasises that new scientific
knowledge can be generated not only by researching a specific deep and strictly defined problem
domain, but also by studying interrelations and integrating the problem domains.
In general, the “what” problems of questions Q1 and Q2 aim at developing hypotheses and
propositions for further study (Yin, 1994). That is, Q1 and Q2 aim at analysing maintenance
systems. This dissertation is by nature constructive and the analysis was done by a conceptual
literature study to induce the theory of maintenance systems from the existing reliability
paradigms (Q1-Q2). Weinberg (1975, p. 143) calls this non-observing methodology academic
science with the value of creating ideals not bound to a specific paradigm. Finding analogies
between the paradigms makes it possible to generate a theory of maintenance systems that is
derived from a family of paradigms. Operating with analogies is a form of inductive logic
without the necessity of forming its conclusions logically from its premises. The strength of this
methodology in this dissertation is that no specific regional or cultural maintenance paradigm
dominates the theory. The main weakness is the possible generality of the theory, which may
increase the probability of the existence of such a system, but reduce the informative value of the
models based on the theory.
The literature study was aligned by data acquired from interviews and observations of
representatives of industrial companies. The interviews were open and informal attempting to
answer the question: how do/would you use information technology and automatic condition
monitoring in maintenance processes. The weakness of open and unstructured interviews is the
possibility that the interviewer manipulates the discussion unconsciously. Therefore,
observations of discussions at a public discussion forum on the Internet were also used to verify
that the interviews were focused on the right topics. The interviews and observations should not
be considered as giving very high empirical evidence. The companies, subjects and interviewing
times are presented in Appendix A: Interviews.
The theory of maintenance systems was then used for deriving the models to provide
answers to questions Q2-Q3, and finally the conclusions of the research were derived. The
methodological research approach is shown in Figure 1. It should be noted that the research was
somewhat iterative from theory part to models and back to theory part.
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Reliability paradigms and systems theory
literature study
Maintenance
systems theory
Induce
Models
Conclusions
Industry observations and interviews
Verify
Align
Model
Conclude
Figure 1 The methodological approach of the research.
1.4 MODELLING METHODOLOGIES
The focus of the developed theory of maintenance systems is to define and describe the
maintenance systems and the boundary conditions for modelling such systems. Mathematical
systems theory focuses on formal and rigorous quantitative models of systems, whereas applied
systems theory, or systems technology, focuses on more qualitative, practical applications, such
as software development for specific problems (Laszlo, 1972). The system models sought after
in this dissertation are on the one hand knowledge models of the problem domain of interest, and
on the other hand functional models that must be presented as mathematical models. Therefore,
both applied systems thinking and quantitative systems modelling are used.
The synthesised maintenance information system theory is presented as figures, tables and
written text. The knowledge constructs of the theory are presented in a more formalised
knowledge representation format, namely unified modelling language (UML) domain models
(Larman, 2002). The control aspects of maintenance systems are captured by mapping the
information systems framework of Gorry and Morton (1989) to the maintenance activities. The
cost model and stochastic behaviour are modelled with stochastic simulation, and the
behavioural modelling is done with time-dependent dynamic models.
1.5 INCLUDED INDUSTRIES OF THE RESEARCH
Proactive maintenance and reliability are most important in industries where the cost of failures,
the failure rates and the cost of maintenance are high (Komonen, 1998). Therefore, this
dissertation applies best to highly integrated process industries, such as pulp and paper or
chemical industries. The models and results may be applicable to other industries such as
aeronautics and nuclear energy production but these specific application areas are not explicitly
considered in the dissertation.
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2 BACKGROUND INTERVIEWS AND
OBSERVATIONS
As noted in Chapter 1, the observations and interviews should not be considered as empirical
research with very high scientific evidence. However, they represent an important source of
insight and alignment for the research. The interviews and observations are reviewed in this
chapter.
2.1 INTERVIEWS
The interviews were unstructured open discussions and held between March 12, 2002 and
January 7, 2003. The interviews consisted of 21 interview sessions including 29 different
persons from 10 different companies. Fourteen interviewees came from Metso Corporation
serving mainly the pulp and paper industry. The other interviewees came from the service and
information technology providers, pulp and paper maintenance management and component
manufacturers. Because a large proportion of the interviewees was from machine manufacturers
and technology providers, the viewpoint is oriented towards machine-suppliers and information
technology providers.
The purpose of the interviews was to ask how information technology and remote condition
monitoring could be used to enhance industrial maintenance activities. A large proportion of the
discussed topics fell either under computerised maintenance management system (CMMS) or
remote condition monitoring and failure diagnostics (INTERVIEWS 2, 3, 4, 5.1, 5.2, 6, 8, 9, 10,
11, 12, 14, 15.1, 15.2, 16, 18.1, 18.2, 19, 20, 21.1, 21.2, 21.3, 21.4). The general sentiment
among the interviewees was that the application of information technology was expected to
bring dramatic results in machine reliability and maintenance process efficiency. At the same
time, most interviewees were unable to show or calculate the benefits of the application of
information technologies.
2.1.1 Business drivers
Some interviewees (INTERVIEWS 5.1, 5.2, 11) presented an idea that remote condition
monitoring might help them bypass the other maintenance companies and help in offering
maintenance services. The idea is that with condition monitoring the machine manufacturer
could get so much information about the condition and operation of the machines, that the
machine manufacturer is able to predict the failures and offer the optimal methods to operate the
machines. This would change the service business so that the machine manufacturer would
control the maintenance business with the help of remote condition monitoring. If using an in-
house service organisation these technologies were seen as a means to enhance service efficiency
and customer loyalty (INTERVIEWS 3, 4, 5.1, 5.2, 9, 10, 11, 12, 16, 20).
2.1.2 Computerised maintenance management
Interviews with CMMS providers (INTERVIEWS 8, 9, 12) indicated that the CMMS software
packages are indeed very large and full of features, such as work-order management, reporting,
inventory control, audit trails and much more. The actual problem seems not to be the CMMS
technology but the implementation and usage of the CMMS systems. As an example, a CMMS
implementation project was reported as successful, but only 15 % of the CMMS features were
taken into use. Thus, the problem of implementing information systems to control a maintenance
15
system is related to the structures and operation of the maintenance system rather than to being a
technical problem.
2.1.3 Manufacturer and user-perceived failures and design criteria for
machines
Some practical problems arise with the definition of failures. According to the interviewed
representatives of an industrial valve manufacturing company (INTERVIEWS 4, 15.1) up to
30% of old plant control valves may be non-functional or oscillating and thus failed. Still, the
plants produce good-quality products, which means that the valves have not necessarily failed
from the user perspective.
An interviewed technology director (INTERVIEW 11) of an industrial valve manufacturer
noted that equipment specifications are set at the plant design phase, but the specifications are
often too tight or too loose, and seldom describe the real operating point or control limits of the
process. This was confirmed by the interviewed consulting company representatives
(INTERVIEW 18.1, INTERVIEW 18.2). According to them, the process equipment is usually
oversized in order to be able to increase the plant capacity later. Therefore, the design-phase
specifications cannot be used for defining whether the machine is failed or not.
2.1.4 Preventive replacement policies and condition monitoring
An interviewed industrial valve maintenance manager (INTERVIEW 7) told that the paper and
pulp industry customers are often willing to change the whole control valve, instead of changing
just the valve, actuator or positioner even if the failure can be identified to one of these
subsystems. The interviewee also told that in a petrochemical plant the whole plant is shut down
every four years and every deteriorating and critical component is changed. Similarly, a paper
industry representative (INTERVIEW 17) told that when changing a failed bearing in a paper
machine roll, the other bearing is also changed regardless of its age. The reason for the change
policy is that the additional cost of changing the other bearing as well is low when the whole roll
is detached from the machine.
The reasoning of the interviewees seem to represent the ideology that the maintenance staff
in these process industries always wants to make certain that the system under maintenance is
totally restored. Restoring the system state at certain points of time may help in keeping track of
the system state and in standardisation of the maintenance activities.
The same paper industry representative (INTERVIEW 17) told that under condition
monitoring the bearing is changed only if the condition monitoring indicates failure or the age of
the bearing is exceptionally high. This means that they do not fully trust to condition monitoring
systems.
2.2 OBSERVATIONS OF DISCUSSION IN THE MAILING
LIST OF RELIABILITYWEB.COM
The reliabilityweb.com e-mail discussion list is open for reliability and maintenance
professionals. The discussion list is moderated so that commercial e-mails are filtered out quite
well. The observed e-mails were sent between May 1, 2002 and January 25, 2003. During that
time, a total of 497 e-mails were read through, archived and later categorised by reading them
through one more time. There were 139 message senders from a large number of organisations
around the world. The viewpoint the e-mail discussion list gives is user-oriented because of the
16
large number of e-mails related to operative and maintenance management topics. The categories
used in analysing the messages are shown in Table 1.
Category Description of Discussion Topics
CM Automatic and manual condition monitoring methods of machines
CMMS Computerised maintenance management system, maintenance scheduling,
planning and reporting software
MAINT
MGMT.
Labour and cost management methods, job descriptions, cost estimates,
maintenance and workforce planning
MATH
MODELING
MTBM, MTTF, availability calculations, simulation and Markov models
OPERATIVE
MAINT.
Specific machine functional problems, failures,  technologies and opinions
PM Preventive maintenance methods, such as lubrication, component change
intervals
RCA Root-cause analysis implementation and usage
RCM Reliability-centered maintenance methodologies and implementation
TPM Total productive maintenance related issues, such as autonomous
maintenance by operators
UNRELATED Author's messages (3) and replies to them (1), some commercials, accidental
messages
 Table 1 Reliabilityweb.com e-mail discussion list categories.
The number of messages and the fraction of total messages in each category are presented in
Figure 2.
106
103
78
76
42
36
21
13
13
9
21,3 %
20,7 %
15,7 %
15,3 %
8,5 %
7,2 %
4,2 %
2,6 %
2,6 %
1,8 %
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
OPERATIVE MAINT.
MAINT MGMT
CMMS
CM
RCM
MATH MODELING
UNRELATED
TPM
PM
RCA
Figure 2 Number and percentage of Reliabilityweb.com e-mail discussion list messages by
category.
During the observation period, the e-mail discussion list was heavily used by maintenance
managers and also by some reliability consultants. A large number (42.0 %) of the messages
were directly related to maintenance management and practical maintenance and reliability
problems, such as selecting the correct maintenance method or tool. The CMMS and condition
monitoring were also (31.0 %) lively topics.
These messages support the interviews: efficiency and reliability gains are sought from
condition monitoring and CMMS technologies. Some interest was seen in using hand-held
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devices in reporting the maintenance actions, but the main CMMS discussion was about how
and which CMMS system to implement and how to use a CMMS system. The condition
monitoring discussion focused much on vibration analysis of bearings and electrical motors.
Compared to total productive maintenance (TPM) (2.6 %) reliability-centered maintenance
(RCM) (8.5 %) was also a popular topic. Perhaps the reason was that there were quite many
discussion participants from the USA, Europe, Australia and South-America where RCM is the
dominating paradigm.
Quite surprisingly, several participants were interested in mathematical modelling (7.2 %):
reliability, availability and cost calculation methods were raised quite frequently. The motivation
for the calculations was quite obviously to prove the effectiveness of the selected maintenance
policies and technologies.
Preventive maintenance (2.6 %) was not a popular topic by itself. Probably this does not
indicate that preventive maintenance is not interesting or being applied, but the interest was
expressed under other topics, such as mathematical modelling and discussion related to operative
maintenance. Root-cause analysis (1.8 %) was a topic that could have been categorised under
maintenance management. However, as a specific reliability method it deserves its own
category.
2.3 SUMMARY OF INTERVIEWS AND
RELIABILITYWEB.COM OBSERVATIONS
Both the interviews and e-mail discussion list indicate that there are two equally interesting areas
among machine manufacturers and users to apply information technology in industrial
maintenance: CMMS and condition monitoring. However, the interviews and observations give
conflicting signals that while the technology providers are trying to develop more and more
advanced tools, the maintenance departments seem to struggle with daily problems of
implementing and operating such systems. The technology providers or the users do generally
not know the feasibility of applying these technologies, but apparently they seem to improve the
efficiency of the maintenance activities. The users combine their experience and heuristics in
defining maintenance policies and in usage of condition monitoring systems. Some help is
sought from maintenance paradigms such as RCM or TPM. The resulting maintenance systems
seem to be a heterogeneous combination of methods and systems in which the integrating factor
of the information and business processes is the maintenance personnel. The information in the
maintenance systems goes through these human minds forming an organisational information
system and creating a high reliance on the expertise of the maintenance staff.
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3 SCOPING OF THE RESEARCH
Some basic simplifications and assumptions of the research are defined in this chapter to scope
the rest of the dissertation. The first simplification is that the production operations and raw
material supplies are assumed reliable and stable, and initially no maintenance is being executed.
In a homogeneous environment and with stable operation nothing else than the failures of
machines can disturb the production process. It is therefore is assumed that machine failures are
the only source of production disturbances.
The assumption about a constant production environment is fair considering the scope of this
dissertation: studying entire production systems would extend the research way too far from the
original research problem. If no maintenance is done, then the only source of disturbances must
be the machines, since they are the only deteriorating and variability-generating elements in the
production system. For practical purposes this assumption about the lack of maintenance is not
realistic. A production system without maintenance or would eventually cease operating
regardless of how durable the system initially was. Therefore reliability, the probability that a
machine does not fail during a given time interval, decreases. In mathematical terms this means
that the reliability function R(t)=P(T>t), t>0, where T is operating time to failure (TTF),
approaches zero for infinite large values of t.
There are several ways to increase the reliability of a machine, such as design improvements,
lubrication, cleaning, operator training, tuning, and replacing of worn machine parts. Apart from
machine or process design improvements most of these actions can be categorised under the
loosely defined term maintenance. A formal definition of maintenance is given by IEC 60050-
191 (1996) as "the combination of all technical and administrative actions, including
supervision actions, intended to retain an entity in, or restore it to, a state in which it can
perform a required function."
Machines have to be maintained in order to increase reliability and thereby avoid production
disturbances. It is therefore assumed that the purpose of a single maintenance action is to
increase reliability. I.e. P(Tm > t) > P(T > t) ⇒ Tm > T,  where t is the operating time, T is the
time to failure prior to maintenance and Tm is time to failure after maintenance.
Including the maintenance in the system scope creates an additional source of production
disturbances. Maintenance itself is also a potential source of machine failures and may cause
disturbances to production. In addition to maintenance, there may be failures originating from
machine construction and varying quality of raw materials to be processed with the machines.
These latter failure types are possible and even probable in a real world, but they are more or less
related to the behaviour of the production process and the errors in machine design and
manufacturing process, which are not included in the scope of this dissertation research.
To increase the reliability of machines, failures originating from the machines should be
reduced. However, the absolute objective of failure reduction does not probably yield the most
optimal results with regard to the financial objectives, because the costs of reliability may exceed
the returns of reliability. Wireman (1998, p.1) defines the objective of maintenance in his
definition of maintenance management as "the management of all assets2 owned by a company,
based on maximizing the return on investment in the asset."
The motivation for maintenance is not the absolute reduction of the production disturbances
but the optimisation of costs between maintenance and the failures. The assumption is that the
                                                     
2 In literature the term asset is often used to denote any physical object, such as device, equipment, machine, or even
building. The term “asset” is a broader term than “machine” referring to any physical property that has been invested
in. In this dissertation, the terms machine, component, equipment and asset are used interchangeably.
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objective of maintenance as a whole is to minimise the costs of maintenance and failures. As a
word, "cost" may include any damages whether financial, safety or environmental.
The relevant literature in respect to these assumptions will be reviewed in the following
chapters.
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4 REVIEW OF RELIABILITY AND
MAINTENANCE LITERATURE
In this chapter, the basic maintenance terminology, the reliability paradigms, maintenance
process activities and some maintenance business aspects are reviewed in order to build the
foundations for a theory of maintenance systems.
4.1 TERMINOLOGY
The term maintenance includes various actions and tasks that aim to increase or to retain the
reliability of the machines. A term often presented is maintenance policy, which refers to the
categories of the maintenance actions applied on the machines. Depending on the industry and
the applied maintenance paradigm the terms of the categories vary. Such terms include
condition-based maintenance, failure-based maintenance, preventive maintenance, predictive
maintenance, reactive maintenance and corrective maintenance (i.e. Horner et al., 1997; Jonsson,
1999; Moubray, 1997; Nakajima, 1989). Principally all the categories refer to the timing or
methodology of the maintenance activity.
The main categorisation is maintenance activities that happen before and after a failure.
Therefore, the terms proactive maintenance and reactive maintenance are used. Proactive and
reactive maintenance may be planned or unplanned. This means that the work procedures of the
maintenance action and its required resources are either planned or unplanned before the need
for the maintenance action. A maintenance action for a failure that has never before occurred is
difficult to plan beforehand. Therefore, reactive maintenance is often thought as a synonym for
unplanned maintenance. However, planning for reactive maintenance can be done if the required
maintenance procedures are known. For example, the replacement procedures and resource
requirements of a light bulb failure can be planned even if the maintenance action is reactive.
Proactive maintenance action can be preventive or predictive. Preventive maintenance tries
to prevent a failure before its occurrence with such activities as lubricating, cleaning or changing
a wearing component in a machine. Predictive maintenance, also know as condition-based
maintenance, tries to detect the machine condition automatically or manually, for executing the
maintenance action based on the actual condition of the machine. Scheduled maintenance is a
proactive maintenance action that has been scheduled beforehand according to a plan. Proactive
maintenance can be scheduled, but reactive maintenance can never be scheduled in advance.
4.2 RELIABILITY PARADIGMS
According to the literature study there are four main reliability-related paradigms being applied,
namely reliability-centered maintenance (RCM), total productive maintenance (TPM), reliability
engineering (RE) and control engineering (CE). All the paradigms apply various methodologies
and maintenance policies to the control of reliability. The origins of the paradigms are different,
as well as their application domain and the viewpoint. RCM and TPM originate from industry
practices, and reliability engineering and control engineering originate from mathematical and
systems science. All these paradigms are reviewed briefly to be able to really understand the
various approaches to reliability and how the industrial maintenance is being planned and
controlled.
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4.2.1 Reliability-centered maintenance
The history of RCM originates from the task force work of the US aviation industry in the 1960s
and 1970s to improve safety and reliability of civil aircraft (Jardine, 1999). A sequence of
guidelines and handbooks were published, namely MSG-1, MSG-2, and MSG-3 (Air Transport
Association of America, 1993). United Airlines was sponsored by the US Department of
Defence to write a report about the relationships between maintenance, reliability and safety,
which became the foundation for RCM. RCM is a rather heavy framework for developing
maintenance strategy. As a development methodology RCM answers to the following questions
(Moubray, 1997): i) What are the functions and associated performance standards of the machine
in its present operating context, ii) in what way does it fail to fulfil its functions, iii) what causes
each functional failure, iv) what happens when each failure occurs, v) in what way does each
failure matter in respect of the environment, human safety, losses, and expenses, vi) what can be
done to predict or prevent each failure, vii) what should be done if a suitable proactive task
cannot be found?
The core idea of RCM, as indicated by the questions, is that any physical machine or system
has at least one function and the users have performance requirements for that function. The
machine is considered as a system in an operating context, or environment.
The failure of a machine is its inability to do what its users want it to do. In other words,
RCM defines the failure as a state of the machine that cannot be accepted by the user. A specific
term functional failure is defined as  “the inability of any asset to fulfil a function to a standard
of performance which is acceptable to the user” (Moubray, 1997, p. 47). This definition
emphasises the failure as being any state in which a user-defined performance standard of a
function of the machine cannot be achieved. The definition separates failures from the physical
properties of the machine. Even if the machine is physically damaged but can achieve the
performance level that the user expects from the machine, there is no failure according to the
RCM paradigm. On the other hand, a failure may occur due to changing requirements of the user
without changes in the structural or functional properties of the machine.
By answering to the third question the RCM methodology tries to identify the events that
cause the machine to go into a failed state. These events are called failure modes3. RCM
distinguishes total failure, which is total loss of function, from partial failure, which is the
inability to meet the performance standards even when the machine still functions. The failure
event searching procedure, failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA), is performed for each
functional failure. That is, for each possible failed state the causing events and the consequent
events are identified for purposes of predicting the effects of failures. The failure consequences
are identified in respect to human safety, environment, production operations, and repair costs in
order to create a proactive strategy for preventing them. Due to the origin of aeronautics, the
RCM methodology places human and environmental values before material values.
Some lightweight methods of RCM have been developed, such as PM Optimization (PMO)
that starts from the existing proactive maintenance policies and tries to identify which failure
events it is trying to prevent (Turner, 2001). This approach answers quickly to the first three
questions of RCM. After that the same logic is followed as in RCM. A drawback of PM
Optimization is that it may miss some failure scenarios that could be identified by the RCM
methodology.
In summary, RCM acknowledges that the objectives for maintenance should be defined from
the idea of what the machine does  not what the machine is. The focus of RCM is to use
proactive tasks to eliminate the events that cause failures. The failure effects and consequences
to the operation, safety and environment are assessed to prioritise the proactive maintenance
tasks. As the primary value of RCM is human safety, the methodology is quite heavy in trying to
                                                     
3 In this dissertation the term failure event that equals to RCM term failure mode is used
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predict what might happen. Thus, it cannot be used very often. For example, the NASA (1996)
guideline for facilities proposes an RCM analysis every two years.
4.2.2 Total productive maintenance
Total productive maintenance combines total quality management and proactive maintenance
policies in order to achieve maximum production efficiency. The history of TPM originates from
the preventive maintenance and reliability engineering research from the 1950s. The reliability
engineering paradigm was combined with Japanese quality management in the 1970s. As a
strategic management paradigm TPM emphasises the importance of quality and employee
participation in maintenance management. The most central objective of TPM is the
maximisation of the overall equipment4 effectiveness (OEE), which is calculated by (Nakajima,
1988)
OEE = Availability (%) ⋅ Performance (%) ⋅ Quality (%) (1)
where availability is the operating time of the available working time. Performance is the ratio of
the actual production of the maximum production, and quality (yield) is the ratio of good
products of the total production as shown in Figure 3.
Total Time
Operating Time
Net Available Time
Net
Operating Time
Effective
Operating
Time
Scheduled Downtime
Downtime
Speed losses
Defect losses
Availability = Op. Time / Net Available Time
Performance = Net Op. Time / Op. Time
Quality = Effective Op. Time / Net Op. Time
Figure 3 OEE Calculation (adapted from Nakajima, 1988, p. 25).
To achieve maximal OOE TPM tries to eliminate “the six big losses” that have a negative effect
on the OEE. These losses are categorised in three groups: downtime, speed losses and quality
defects. Downtime losses consist of machine failures and lost time to setups and adjustments.
Speed losses consist of idling and minor stoppages due to disturbances in the machine operations
and of reduced speed. Defects consist of process defects from scrap and reduced yield from
machine startups.
The failures in TPM are known as breakdowns of two types: function-loss breakdown and
function-reduction breakdown. The function-loss breakdown is a state “in which the equipment
functioning stops.” (Shirose and Gotō, 1989, p. 86) The function-reduction breakdown is a state
in which the machine still operates but causes speed losses and defects. These definitions are
very close to the failure and partial failure definitions in RCM. Nakajima (1989) makes a clear
distinction between sudden failures and chronic failures. Sudden failures are the failures that
happen randomly. Usually they are easy to detect because they change the status quo of the
production capability of a factory. Contrasted to sudden failures, chronic failures are small,
occur frequently, and they are hidden in the production system. They are considered normal, and
therefore are not noted, or prevented. Thus, they can be found only by comparing the current
                                                     
4 In TPM the used term is “equipment”, in the context of this dissertation, the words machine, part or component are
used
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status quo to the theoretical or optimal conditions. The causes of chronic problems, such as dirt
and moisture, are not necessarily critical alone, but the causes often amplify each other.
Therefore, TPM emphasises standardising the operating conditions by cleaning the machines,
which also serves as inspection of the machines.
Proactive maintenance in TPM focuses on periodic inspections, planned restoration and
routine maintenance (Miyoshi, 1989). The main information source of predictive maintenance is
the inspections that serve both the planning for routine maintenance as well as restoration of the
machines. TPM promotes the importance of machine operators in the basic maintenance
activities, such as inspections and cleaning. This increases the possibility to identify failures
before their consequences become too costly. The preventive maintenance program is derived
from the statutory regulations, machine maintenance standards, breakdowns and work order
history.
In summary, TPM tries to stabilise the operating environment of the machines by keeping
them clean and at the same time by inspecting them with human senses. The absolute OEE goal
aim at making it possible to detect chronic failures that could otherwise be undetected. Standard
operating procedures help in making the maintenance actions more repeatable.
4.2.3 Reliability engineering
Reliability engineering is a well-established branch of mathematical and machine design science
(i.e. Bukowski and Goble, 2001; IEC 60050-191, 1996; Endrenyi et al., 2001; Høyland and
Rausand, 1994; Pulkkinen, 1994; Schneeweiss, 2001; Simola, 1999; Turner, 2002; Villemeur,
1992). The relation of reliability engineering to maintenance is characterised by Air Transport
Association of America (1993, p. 2) in the additional note to the maintenance program
objectives:
These objectives recognize that maintenance programs, as such, cannot correct deficiencies in
the inherent safety and reliability levels of the equipment. The maintenance program can only
prevent deterioration of such inherent levels. If the inherent levels are found to be
unsatisfactory, design modification is necessary to obtain improvement.
Maintenance cannot improve the capability and reliability of a machine above the inherent levels
of that machine. Therefore, the machine design and materials are the most significant factors
when determining the maximum reliability of systems.
As a methodology, reliability engineering focuses on identifying causes, probabilities and
consequences of failures to plan the relevant actions to reduce them. This is done by modelling
physical systems and their reliability and failure characteristics with mathematical models or by
using more qualitative decision analysis (Vatn, 1997, for example). The physical systems are
often modelled with reliability networks or fault trees (IEC 61025, 1990), which describe the
relations of the components and how failures of one component affect the operation of other
components. The failure occurrence and duration probabilities of the systems and components
are modelled by using probability distributions, such as Weibull, exponential and Gamma
distributions. By using these models it is possible to estimate the lifetime and failure
probabilities of components and the systems consisting of those components.
Reliability engineering makes some assumptions about the failures. The formal definition for
the word “failure” is usually left out from the reliability engineering literature and mathematical
models. Often, failures are considered as binary events that happen stochastically during the life
cycle of the machine. The machine is either in failed state or not. The reliability engineering
methodologies rarely present methodologies for handling partial failures. The main reason seems
to be that it is very difficult to model the propagation of partial failures to other partial failures in
the system of interest.
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As a mathematical science, the focus is on the failure models and their applicability to
different systems. Since the approach is probabilistic and focuses on estimating the average or
asymptotic reliability of systems, this approach is being used by machine manufacturers who
have the interest to enhance the maintenance and the inherent reliability of their products.
4.2.4 Control engineering
Dynamic system modelling and system control is a science of control and automation
engineering. The process variables are controlled with mathematical algorithms, such as PID
controllers (Åström and Hägglund, 2000). The controllers maintain satisfactory operations by
compensating disturbances in the process. The used term for undesired system states is fault
(Chiang et al., 2001).
Fault detection and diagnosis are important fields of research with the aim to keep the
operators and maintenance informed about the status of the process and to diagnose the cause of
possible faults. The three categories to detect an abnormal process condition are data-driven,
analytical or knowledge-based methods (Chiang et al., 2001; Lewin, 1995). Data driven models
operate purely on measured process data and reduce the measured data to lower dimension data
without losing essential information of the original data. Analytical methods use mathematical
models and parameter estimation to detect faults. Knowledge-based methods use causal analysis,
expert systems or pattern recognition to detect faults.
The control engineering approach to regulate the failures is to control the production
processes and compensate the disturbances in the production system. Therefore, a stable process
should have some stochastic operating parameter limits or the operating parameters should
follow dynamically modelled behaviour. A deviation of a process parameter from the statistical
or modelled behaviour is a sign of an abnormal process state, which may indicate that a failure
event has occurred.
The difficulty of the control engineering approach is that the industrial manufacturing and
production processes are not always stable. When there is a change in the production plan or
produced product the system may be in a labile state causing difficulties in control and wrong
alerts.
4.2.5 Summary of paradigms
TPM and RCM reflect the cultural backgrounds of their origins. RCM is a forward planning re-
engineering methodology, whereas TPM emphasises small continuous improvements by the
plant employees. The focus areas are somewhat different: RCM focus on keeping the status quo
of machines, and TPM focus on maximising the throughput of machines. Control engineering is
not closely related to the other three paradigms and approaches failures from the viewpoint of
systems control science, although some reliability-engineering approaches, such as proportional
hazard model (PHM) use a combination of data-driven models with failure probability
distributions (Kobbacy et al., 1997) and Markov-chains (Wiseman, 1999).
In summary, the formalised connections between RCM, TPM, reliability engineering and
control engineering are surprisingly weakly defined although all the paradigms are often applied
in production plants, at least partially. This is due to the slightly different scopes and objectives
of the paradigms. The following Table 2 tries to capture the differences of these maintenance
and reliability paradigms.
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RCM TPM Reliability
Engineering
Control
Engineering
Scope Machine
functionality
Machine efficiency Machine
durability
Machine
controllability
Maintenance
objective
according to
paradigm
Keeping the
machine
functionality at
the required level
Maximising the
machine capacity
by equipment
efficiency
Enhancing the
machine life-time
and reliability
Maintaining the
production process
state
Failure or failed
state
Inability to fulfil
user-required
functional
capability
Loss or reduction of
a capability with
regard to optimal
performance
Loss of a function Statistically
abnormal process
state
Life-cycle phase
being applied
At the machine
design and
operation phase
At the machine
operation phase
At the machine
design phase
At the machine
operation phase
Context Single machines,
users, and plant
Single machines,
users, and plant
Multiple
machines, users,
and plants
Single production
process
Applicable
methods
Proactive
maintenance by
preventing
failures before
they first occur
Personnel
participation in
continuous
improvement for
preventing sudden
and chronic failures
Design-out
failures with
enhanced
component design
and materials
Control of process
states and
compensation of
disturbances by
mathematical
algorithms.
Table 2 Table of reliability paradigms.
4.3 MAINTENANCE PROCESSES
As an activity, maintenance can be described as a business process. The term is a bit fuzzy and
overloaded. The idea of a business process concept is that there are several sequential activities
that form an information processing chain. Sharp & McDermott (2001) define business process
as “a collection of interrelated work tasks, initiated in response to an event, that achieves a
specific result for the customer of the process.”  This definition emphasises that the process
instance is triggered by an event, and consists of work tasks to satisfy the customer needs. Sharp
and McDermott (2001) mention that in some cases the information systems and business
processes cannot be separated. The information system implements a business process and
enables the process workflow. Therefore, it is important to understand the maintenance process
in order to model the effects of information systems.
Detailed description of a maintenance process is difficult. The implementation of the process
workflow depends on the applied industry and company. The process model in this chapter is
derived from literature (Johnstone and Ward, 1981; Dhillon and Reiche, 1985), interviews
(INTERVIEWS 8, 9, 12) and from observing the documentation of a computerised maintenance
management system product (MRO Software, 2001). The model is general and should be
suitable for describing most maintenance processes. Its informative value is not very high, but it
should be accurate enough to provide an understanding of the activities in maintenance systems.
The triggering events for maintenance processes are i) reactive failure event, usually in form
of a failure report or work request, ii) condition-based maintenance event, from inspections or
automatic condition monitoring, iii) preventive maintenance event, from preventive maintenance
program, and iv) backlog event, from a work queue that should have already been done.
The previous initiating events indicate that there is a queue of work to be done. This queue is
filled with work orders arising from failures. The work orders are processed by the maintenance
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staff that maintain the machines. The failures may be predicted by inspecting the machines or by
using automatic condition monitoring. Manual inspection is a periodic activity triggered by a
"watchdog" subsystem that monitors the time or usage of the machine, thus creating a
maintenance work order that is placed in the queue. Preventive maintenance is similar to
inspections: The maintenance action is triggered by a time or usage monitoring system, and the
order is placed in the queue. Several applications of the queuing theory have been presented in
maintenance resource allocation (e.g. Komonen, 1998; Taha, 1992).
Depending on the viewpoint, the customer of the maintenance process is either the
production process owner or the production machinery owner. The production process requires
functional machines, and therefore the production process is directly affected by the quality and
efficiency of the maintenance process. On the other hand, the machine owner has invested
money in the machines and expects long-term profitability from the investment. The production
process owner and machine owner are not necessarily the same organisation. There are situations
where a machine is leased from a leasing company to a production plant, for example.
The main activities in maintenance are planning, scheduling and execution. Planning consists
of planning the actual work activities and the resource needs, such as tools, materials and work
skills for the maintenance task. Scheduling consists of arranging the maintenance tasks in the
right order and time concerning the production plan and resource availability. Execution of the
maintenance task consists of such activities as installation, inspection, modification, restoration
and repair of the machines.
In addition to these there are some supporting activities such as recording failures, work
requests, maintenance execution reports, machine configuration changes and administration of
reporting, budgeting, engineering, regulatory compliance, and inventory control. In order to keep
the models simple the supporting activities have been left out of the process flow diagrams. The
modelled two process flows are presented in Figure 4 and Figure 5.
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Figure 4 A reactive maintenance process flow diagram
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Figure 5 A proactive maintenance process flow diagram.
The reactive maintenance process in Figure 4 begins with a failure or possible failure
identification. The failure is then diagnosed. Diagnosing is an activity that may require several
participants from specialists to production personnel. After the failure is diagnosed, repair is
planned and materials are ordered. After that, the repair is scheduled, and the work is ordered.
When the materials are available the machine is repaired according to the schedule.
The process flow diagram indicates that the throughput, or cycle time of reactive
maintenance is affected by the notification, diagnostics, planning and dispatching time as well as
the repair time itself. Therefore, failure notification, diagnostics, planning, scheduling, or work
order dispatching should be more efficient to increase the efficiency of the process. Logistics
delay can be reduced by keeping a stock of materials available for maintenance.
The proactive maintenance process flow in Figure 5 does not include the diagnostics stage.
In practice, this is not always true. When using condition monitoring there may be signs of
future failures, which makes it possible to predict a failure. The symptoms may be so clear that
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there is no need for diagnostics, but if the symptoms are unknown or contradictory there may be
a similar diagnostics stage as in reactive maintenance. Failure prediction marks the beginning of
a process as well as the preventive event that is created according to machine operating time or
other usage measurement. If the process is well designed and pre-planned, the waiting time from
the event to the beginning of maintenance execution should be much shorter than in the reactive
process. Also, the materials can be ordered before the failure occurs so that they are ready for
use when needed.
The process flows indicate that proactive maintenance is quicker and more easily
standardisable than the reactive process. However, the contents of the process planning and
execution stages of proactive maintenance depend on the failure type. Furthermore, the
feasibility of proactive and reactive maintenance is defined by the cost of failures and the
maintenance, rather than the efficiency of the processes alone.
4.4 BUSINESS ASPECTS
Proactive maintenance can be seen as a method to convert variable costs of failures to fixed costs
of maintenance. Maintenance is an expense to the owner of the machines, but also a business
opportunity to the spare parts and maintenance service providers. The maintenance costs and
revenues are the main drivers for controlling the reliability of machines and the efficiency of
maintenance processes.
4.4.1 The costs and revenues of maintenance
File (1991) presents the costs and revenues from these two points of view as presented in Figure
6 and Figure 7.
Maintenance costs
Direct Indirect
Labour
Parts
Materials
Transportation
Training
Capital costs
Overheads
Occupancy
Costs of employment
Information systems
Operating losses
Reject rates
Over capacity
Maintenance support
Figure 6 The costs of maintenance (File, 1991, p. 96).
The costs can be divided into direct and indirect costs. Direct costs are related to the efficiency
of the maintenance processes and they are easier to calculate than indirect costs. Indirect costs
are related to the effectiveness of the maintenance process to reliable production. Also, too high
production capacity, or over-maintaining, as well as the supporting activities, such as production
personnel support for the maintenance personnel, can be calculated as indirect costs.
Maintenance costs are often allocated to the maintenance department. MacInnes and Pearce
(2002) claim that this alone may be a wrong way to allocate the costs. They propose that the
costs should be allocated also to the machines. This helps in identifying the costs of machine
ownership and in focusing the maintenance activities.
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Maintenance revenues
ServicesPrime activity
- Maintenance contracts
- Time and materials
Technical
-Sales and trials
 support
-Advice/hot line
Training
-Operator
-Management
-Engineers
Secondary activities
- Parts sales
- Refurbishing
- Warranty repairs
Figure 7 The sources of maintenance revenues (File, 1991, p. 97)
If maintenance is looked at as a revenue-generating business, the main focus is on the
maintenance contracts, which are based on the work time and materials consumed or on the parts
sales, repairs and refurbishing. The services, such as training or support, are a complementary
source of revenues. A maintenance contract usually covers the normal work and materials and
guarantees a specific service level with a fixed yearly price. Therefore, the maintenance service
provider benefits from enhancing the maintenance processes.
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5  SYSTEMS APPROACH TO
MAINTENANCE
In this chapter, maintenance is approached from a systemic point of view. The assumption of
systems approach is that there are many similar entities that behave similar way. Although
failure processes of machines are more or less stochastic, the systems approach seems to fit
conceptually into modelling component behaviour in failure and maintenance processes.
However, the systems approach is not a common one. Contrary, the modelling and optimisation
of maintenance strategies are usually based on control of stochastic systems (e.g. Høyland and
Rausand, 1994) or on applying decision theory (e.g. Vatn et al., 1996; Vatn, 1997).  The value of
systems approach is in its capability to simplify complex problems and model the dependencies
in a system. The drawback is the possible oversimplification and the assumed determinism in the
models, which reduces the quantitative application of the models. However, in this research is
the interest is more on the behaviour than in the optimisation of maintenance systems.
5.1 SYSTEMS
The exact definition of a system varies by author (Kerr, 1991; Klir, 1985; Laszlo, 1972; Turban
and Aronson, 1998; Saaty and Kearns, 1985; Schoderbek et al., 1990; Weinberg, 1975).
However, all definitions share a common idea of an interrelated set of functions and structures
that serve a purpose.
According to Saaty and Kearns (1985), the purpose of a system is a behavioral concept and
difficult to define. They system purpose may change over time or it may have several levels,
such as long-time goals, short time objectives and ideal system states to approach in order to
satisfy an objective. A man-made system serves the purpose of its designer or the system user.
As an observer-related concept, a system may have several different interpretations, according to
the observer. A system can always be considered a subsystem of some larger system.
5.1.1 Functions, structures and environments
System functions transform purposes into action. These actions thus realise the purpose. A
function can be described as an aggregate of its states in space and time. The functions may be
operating parallel and sequentially and the behaviour of the system functions affects the
behaviour of other functions. A system that is factored to its subsystems will consist of a
hierarchical set of functions. The functions are carried out by flows. The types of flows can be
material, energy, information, or transformations from one state to another state. Structure is a
set of constraints on flows in space and time. It consists of forms or parts that relate to one
another to perform a function (Saaty and Kearns, 1985).
An environment always surrounds a system, and the system is separated from its
environment by a boundary. The boundary can be physical, or time frame or some other limiting
element (Turban and Aronson, 1998). The interconnections and interaction among the systems
and their environment are called interfaces. The boundary between the system and its
environment is not always clear, but blurred. A system is called open if it is very dependent on
its environment. Fully closed systems are more theoretical than real, because the only known
fully closed system is the universe. Closed systems do not need external energy or release energy
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to their environment. They also tend to attain maximum entropy5. Open systems exchange input
and output flows with the environment, and may attain a time-independent steady state with the
help of self-regulation.
5.1.2 Complexity and interdependencies
It is characteristic to systems that they are usually very complex, and the system components
have a high number of strong internal connections. The complexity can be described with the
number of interactions and interdependence (Saaty and Kearns, 1985) or the number of system
attributes (Schoderbek et al., 1990). The elements are interdependent and the intensity of the
dependencies varies.
The interdependence is symbiotic, if the systems are dependent on each other for their
existence. The system consisting of subsystems can have emergent properties. That is, such
properties that cannot be found or understood in subsystems since they are generated or
amplified by interaction between the subsystem functionalities. Such a relationship is also called
synergetic (Kerr, 1991; Schoderbek et al., 1990). Weinberg (1975) states as a rule that the whole
is more than the sum of its parts, but also notes that the part is more than a fraction of the whole.
The latter statement tries to remind that even if subsystems do not seem to have emergent
properties, the subsystem may be a part of some other system or have an emergent property there
which is not observable in the currently observed system. That is, a subsystem may serve several
purposes and several systems.
To survive, a system must be adaptive in regard to the changes within itself or in its
environment. The adaptation can occur either in the short run or in the long run. The forms of
adaptability are either functional or structural. Short-run adaptation takes place through
functional changes, whereas long-run adaptation occurs through structural changes. (Schoderbek
et al., 1990). The adaptation can affect the internals or the environment of the system. In the
latter case, the possibilities to control the changes are much more restricted than in the former
case, because the system boundary restricts the possibilities to manipulate the environment.
However, it may be possible to acquire environmental information, or information from inside
the system to help in adapting the system.
5.1.3 Factoring and integrating systems
The method to understand and possibly to find some rules and model the system is to dissect it to
smaller subsystems (Weinberg, 1975). To factor a system into subsystems Kerr (1991) suggests
recursive top-down factoring to simpler systems that contain understandable processes. The
boundaries and interfaces should be clearly defined. In a perfectly connected system, where all
the subsystems are connected to each other, there are n⋅(n-1)/2 interconnections, where n is the
number of subsystems. This makes any such system very difficult to control. Simplification of
the interconnections is therefore essential. Kerr (1991) provides two approaches to simplify
subsystem interactions:
1. By forming clusters of subsystems that interact with each other by using a specialised
interfacing system. The clusters interact by using the interfacing system. A division manager
who acts as a representative of his/her organisation can be regarded as an interfacing system
2. By decoupling subsystems to avoid interaction analysis. Decoupling can be done by using
buffers, slack resources or standard procedures. Heylighen and Joslyn (2001) call these
methods as passive mechanisms to dampen disturbances in a system.
                                                     
5 Entropy here refers to statistical entropy, a measure of system variety defined by the possible states the system can
be in.
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Inventory is an example of a buffer. It reduces or eliminates randomness in a production chain to
propagate backward or forward, and makes control of the systems easier. Slack resources are
capacity that is not used until the normal capacity is unavailable, e.g. a stand-by equipment or
personnel. Standard procedures aim at standardising the informational inputs and outputs of a
system to eliminate the sources of ambiguity and misunderstanding.
Sometimes it is feasible to integrate systems, i.e. when clustering systems instead of
decoupling them. Miller, Rosenthal and Vollman (1986) have defined three types of integration
in manufacturing environments. Technical integration involves establishing physical connections
between the functional areas. Procedural integration uses common data and has a consistent
interpretation of that data between the functional areas. Goal integration uses the same
information to achieve common goals or an objective.
5.1.4 Control systems
To guide the system toward its goals there must be a control decision-making system that
controls the controlled element in the system. Classical cybernetics, which studies the control
and communication of systems, recognises three paradigms of goal oriented system control:
open-loop or information-less paradigm, feed-forward paradigm, and feed-back paradigm
(Wiener, 1961). The difference is which source information the decision-making element uses:
no source information, the same input information as for the controlled element, the output
information of the controlled element, or some combination of them (Klir, 1985, p. 366).
According to Ashby’s (1957, p. 206) Law of Requisite Variety, the larger the variety of
actions available to a control system, the larger the variety of external perturbations and internal
states it is able to compensate. The law states that only variety in the regulating system can force
down variety due to the controlled system. The law has two implications (Umpleby, 2001):
First, there must be a control system that equals the variety of the controlled system. Secondly,
the amount of appropriate selection that a control system can perform is limited by the amount
of information available about the controlled system. The law is a logical law applicable to a
given set of possible states and the actions on those states, not an empirical law that is derived by
observing a real system.
5.1.5 Maintenance activities as a system
There have not been many studies about maintenance as a system. Kerr (1991) briefly notes that
maintenance can be divided into tactical planning of preventive maintenance and operational
control of the execution of the maintenance itself. He suggests that the loss of capacity due to
planned and unplanned maintenance should be known for planning the maintenance, as well as
the complete history of the occurred failures and their frequencies.
It is also difficult to separate the production process and the maintenance processes. The
approach Jonsson (1999) takes is not to separate maintenance from production, but to consider
maintenance as a part of the production process, as shown in Figure 8. The maintenance in this
model creates production capacity, which is secondary input for the production process, and the
production creates maintenance need, which is secondary output of the production process.
Jonsson's (1999) research results indicate that companies that integrate maintenance and their
production strategy have a better competitive position.
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Primary Input Primary OutputProduction process
Maintenance
Secondary Input Secondary Output
Figure 8 The production and maintenance processes (Jonsson, 1999, p. 26).
Lee (2001) presents a more idealistic approach. His focus is on an overall machine optimisation
and management system that is enabled by an intelligent machine. The system closes the loop
between maintenance and the production as shown in Figure 9. The proposed system should
include the machine model that includes the wear and degradation process, diagnostics and fault
detection algorithms. The actual equipment condition should be possible to measure or simulate.
A maintenance model, including a supply chain and management model should exist. The
machine and the maintenance model should be refined according to the maintenance and
equipment condition history. Also, a rough production process model should be included in the
system to manage and simulate the relations of the production process to the equipment and the
maintenance process.
Intelligent
Equipment
Production
Maintenance
actual 
capability
estimated
capability
Maintenance
action
utilization
estimated 
equipment 
availability
estimated cost of
downtime
Figure 9 An enterprise-wide smart machine optimisation and management system. Modified
from Koç and Lee (2001).
5.1.6 Machine reliability and maintenance system effectiveness
Allen (2001) distinguishes the approaches to study the effect of maintenance into either physical
machine health or maintenance system effectiveness itself. In the first approach, all those actions
are considered that reverse the effects of machine ageing over the component life-cycle. This
makes it possible to clean the effect of maintenance to the machine. The drawback is that the
every single maintenance action should be tracked over the total life-cycle of a component in a
constant process environment.
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In the latter approach, the machine age is calculated backward from the failure to the
moment the machine was take into use or renewed. This approach does not take into account
each maintenance task but the overall maintenance on the machine. Thus, any ad-hoc
maintenance is considered as an external influence on the maintenance system. The question that
Allen (2001) raises is whether to model the reliability of the controlled system (reliability
engineering) or model the effectiveness of the control system (RCM, TPM). The difference is in
the application of the information.
5.1.7 Summary
Maintenance can be considered as a control system for controlling the reliability of machines in
a process environment. The variety of possible states is constrained by the maintenance actions.
Preventive maintenance can be considered as feed-forward control and reactive maintenance as
feed-back control. Condition-based maintenance reacts to the signs of possible future failures,
and is therefore is a mixture of reactive and preventive maintenance. Consequently, condition-
based maintenance represents neither pure feed-forward nor pure feed-back control. If the
preventive maintenance schedule is changed according to the occurred failures, the maintenance
system adapts its behaviour with a higher level of feed-back control.
Because machines are open systems exchanging materials, energy and information with their
environment, their control is complex and rather unpredictable. Ashby's (1957) Law of Requisite
Variety suggests that the more there is information about the machines the more possibilities
there are to select the appropriate maintenance action to control the reliability.
5.2 MAINTENANCE SYSTEM PERFORMANCE
METRICS
The objective of this research is to model maintenance systems and the effects of condition
monitoring. The operation of a maintenance system must be measured to model the effects of
condition monitoring and to be able to control the system. This chapter reviews some of the
maintenance system metrics that could be used as the controlled variables.
5.2.1 Efficiency and effectiveness
Turban and Aronson (1998) propose that systems should be measured with both effectiveness
and efficiency. They define effectiveness as the degree to which the goals are achieved.
Effectiveness is concerned with the results and outputs of the system. Efficiency is a measure of
inputs to achieve outputs. In other words, effectiveness is about doing the right things, and
efficiency is about doing the things right. Sharp and McDermott (2001) propose several process
metrics such as the number of times the process has been executed, the process cycle time, the
cost per execution, cost of defects, and the ratio of good output versus bad output.
Johnstone and Ward (1981) describe metrics for the maintenance system measurement, such
as the number of personnel accidents, maintenance budget variance, maintenance cost per
machine, maintenance cost as percent of capital investment or percent of machine uptime,
workload backlog, overtime ratio and emergency work ratio of total work. Middleton and
Stevens (1999) define three business types: cost-constrained, capacity-constrained and
requirements-constrained. For each of these they suggests different primary metrics: costs, OEE
and quality rate. Wireman (1998) describes several other metrics, including also those that
measure the usage of computerized maintenance systems. He also notes that a common mistake
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in measuring efficiency is using only the input values of the maintenance process, such as the
number of work orders completed and maintenance personnel as percentage of total personnel.
5.2.2 Overall Equipment Efficiency
Jonsson (1999) suggests that maintenance effectiveness should be primarily measured with the
OEE metrics of TPM. According to Jonsson (1999), the strengths of OEE lie in its simplicity and
supporting quality management, continuous improvement and internal efficiency measurements.
OEE calculation presented by Nakajima (1988) does not take planned downtime into account.
The practice varies, and some authors calculate planned downtime in the OEE availability (e.g.
Jonsson, 1999).
Bonal et al. (1996) suggest metrics that combine the OEE calculation and investment costs of
the machines. The goal is to maxims the utilisation of the constraining bottleneck machine of a
production line, i.e. the efficiency of the machine in respect to the investment costs. Otherwise
the productivity improvements could be lost because of production bottlenecks. Moubray (1997)
claims OEE to be misleading focusing on achieving the maximum performance from a machine
regardless of what the performance requirements are. In addition, he states that the costs of
quality losses, performance losses and availability losses are not financially comparable. The
costs of scrap include raw materials plus the lost profits, whereas performance and availability
losses include only profits. Therefore the quality, availability and performance rates would not
be multiplicative.
5.2.3 Availability
By definition (IEC 60050-191, 1996) reliability is a measure of what the ability of a machine to
perform a required function for a given time interval is. Availability is a measure of what the
ability of a machine to perform a required function at a given instant of time is. These terms have
quantitative relationships (US Department of Defence, 1982; IEC 60050-191, 1996) as defined
by the following inherent availability equation
MTTRMTTF
MTTFAi += (2)
where MTTF denotes the mean operating time to failure, and MTTR denotes the mean time to
restore or repair. MTTF is a measure of machine reliability and durability: the longer the
operating time between the failures the more reliable and durable the machine is. MTTR is a
measure of machine maintainability, which tells how much time it takes to restore a machine to
the working state in optimal conditions. Operational availability is defined by
MDTMTBM
MTBMAo += (3)
where MTBM denotes the mean operating time between maintenance, and MDT denotes the
mean downtime caused by maintenance – or lack of maintenance. MTBM is a measure of the
proactive and reactive maintenance frequency of the machine. MDT is a measure of how long
time the maintenance takes on average.
The difference between (2) and (3) are that inherent availability Ai is mainly affected by the
machine design. The design affects the reliability (MTTF) and maintainability (MTTR) of a
machine, which can be seen as the maximum in inherent availability of the machine. Operational
availability Ao represents the availability of the machine in its operating context. Both MTBM
and MDT of Ao calculation are affected not only by design, but also by spare parts availability,
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the applied maintenance policy, and other operational constraints. NASA (1996, pp. 3/20-3/21)
defines the availability metrics as follows:
Inherent Availability Ai
(1) The probability that a system or equipment, when used under stated conditions in an ideal
support environment will operate satisfactorily at any point in time as required.
(2) Excludes preventive or scheduled maintenance actions, logistics delay time and
administrative delay time.
Operational Availability Ao:
(1) The probability that a system or equipment, when used under stated conditions in an actual
operational environment will operate satisfactorily when called upon.
(2) Includes active maintenance time, logistics delay time and administrative delay time.
5.2.4 Proposed effectiveness and efficiency metrics
Turner (2002) criticises the informative value of MTTF. In his opinion, the MTTF is in practice
difficult to calculate. The MTTF information is usually not available by failure type or
component level, and the machine components may be replaced by maintenance and therefore
have an effect on the MTTF. In addition to these arguments Turner states that the maintenance of
the machine, in fact, aims to prevent failures before they occur, and therefore MTTF and Ai
calculated for any machine in operation are unreliable. In other words, he sees the drawbacks in
applying MTTF in reliability modelling (see Chapter 5.1.6). For similar reasons, the US
Department of Defence (1982) suggests that the inherent availability Ai should be used only in
factory acceptance tests, not in measuring the operational reliability of machines.
However, MTTF can be used in maintenance system effectiveness measurement. This is
because in reliability engineering the effect of maintenance must be cleaned from the MTTF
calculation, but in measuring maintenance system the effect of maintenance must be included in
the metrics. The MTTF reveals the effectiveness of the maintenance programme in a certain
operating context for a machine under it, and therefore enables control of the maintenance
system. Therefore, in this dissertation it is proposed that MTTF can and should be used as the
maintenance system effectiveness metrics.
Machine reliability is affected also by other factors than maintenance, such as machine
design. Therefore, high reliability is not absolutely achieved by effective maintenance unless the
other affecting factors make high reliability possible.
Successful control of a maintenance system requires measurement of both the system outputs
(effectiveness) and inputs (resources). The operational availability equation (3) and some
variants of the OEE equation (1) include the proactive maintenance downtime factor, but the
other required input resources, such as materials or labour costs of the maintenance system, are
not included in the metrics. Consequently, this results into a single objective to take as much
capacity out of the machines as possible in regard to calendar time. Therefore, the usage of such
metrics in maintenance system control yields optimal results only temporarily, e.g. when there is
not enough production capacity.
Efficiency is defined in this research as a measure of the ability to use the available resources
to generate the required output. Efficiency can be measured by the required input resources, such
as time and money used in the maintenance system with regard to the reliability that the
maintenance system generates. Reliability has an effect to the number of failures and amount of
downtime and therefore the proposed efficiency metrics is the cost of maintenance and failures.
In practice, the costs must be normalised. For example, the cost of human injuries and
environmental hazards should be normalised so that they can be compared to direct and indirect
monetary losses.
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5.2.5 Availability of source data for the metrics
In the real life, there is a problem of how to collect the information to calculate the metrics.
There are numerous mathematical models in reliability engineering that can be used in
estimating machine lifetime, the effect of maintenance on machine reliability and much more. As
mathematical models they are valid, but real-life calculations with these models face the problem
of definitions and accuracy of the source data. The definitions and the accuracy of measuring
such quantitative maintenance system metrics as the number of failures, operating time and
downtime vary by paradigm, observer, available number of samples and data collection methods.
Therefore, a mathematical reliability engineering method will yield results that are comparable
only to results of similar reliability paradigms, definitions and data collection methods.  Thus,
MTTF, OEE, or Ao of a machine cannot be compared to the MTTF of other machine unless the
definitions, reliability paradigms and data collection methods are similar.
In practice, there seems to be no easy way to gather and calculate accurate operation
information from machines, especially the uptime and stand-by time information. Several papers
in a Finnish national technology programme report (TEKES, 2001) pinpoint difficulties or
suggest automated data collection methods for acquiring the availability data (Foster Wheeler
Energy, p. 22; Konola, p. 36; Mäkitalo, p. 54; Välisalo, p. 67). The methods in the report mainly
utilise data from the production and maintenance personnel by using special reporting systems or
the reports in the maintenance systems. Depending on the organisation, industry, plant policies,
technology, culture, and maintenance process the source data was gathered and the results were
achieved in different ways, case by case, machine type by machine type.
5.3 FAILURES
What seems to be differing in the various reliability paradigms and methodologies is the
definition of basic maintenance terms. The semantics of words is not exactly the same in the
different approaches to reliability. If the definition of a single word that separates a fully
working machine from a non-working one is weak, how is it possible to know when a
maintenance action is needed? Even standards have contradictions: IEC 60050-191 (1996)
defines failure as an event, whereas SAE J1011 (1999) defines failure as a state.
5.3.1 Failure states
The systems theory suggests that a system function is defined by its states and the state changes.
This is in parallel with RCM and TPM thinking, where the failures are system states. Therefore,
it is assumed that a failure is a state. I.e., failure state Sf ∈ S, where S = {S0, S1, …, Sn} is a set of
possible system states.
The systems approach argues that any system state is observer-specific (Ashby, 1957;
Weinberg, 1975). That is, for observers A and B the failure states Sfa  ∈ S and Sfb  ∈ S may differ
so that Sfa≠Sfb. This does not state that the objectivity of observations is a sufficient condition for
objective failure definition, but it helps in understanding why possible system states should be
modelled. It also helps in understanding the RCM/FMEA approach in which the possible failure
states are explicitly defined. Only if the failure state is explicitly defined, can the failure state be
objectively observed and proactive control actions planned. However, the state definition, e.g.
that temperatures of over 50 degrees mean failure, still remains subjective.
In practice, a production system is a man-made system with a purpose. Therefore, the failure
state is always defined by a user. A production system may have several users, or stakeholders,
having different viewpoints and attitudes concerning the purpose of the system. Therefore, the
38
user is merely a role of an organisation, and the failure definitions are not necessary person-
specific but role-specific.
5.3.2 Failure patterns
RCM-related studies (Moubray, 1997; Allen, 2001; Turner, 2002) suggest that increasing the
number of maintenance tasks does not necessary increase the reliability of a machine. The
studies show that in the aircraft and marine industries most of the failures occur because of
components that do not show any ageing but only infant mortality and constant failure
probability after that. The more maintenance and replacements of these components are done,
the more unreliable the systems become.
Figure 10 shows six generic failure patterns of components during their life. A notable
characteristic is that only 8-29 % of failures are age-related in such a way that the failure rate
increases with age. The rest of the failure rates are constantly random or present infant mortality,
which results in that no scheduled restoration can improve the reliability of the component.
UAL Broberg MSP SUBMEPP
1968 1973 1982 2001
4% 3% 3% 2%
2% 1% 17% 10%
5% 4% 3% 17%
7% 11% 6% 9%
14% 15% 42% 56%
68% 66% 29% 6%
Figure 10 Four studies of failure rates as functions of component ages referred by Allen (2001).
UAL and Broberg were studies about aeroplanes, MSP about ships, and SUBMEPP about
military submarines.
Figure 10 shows that the frequency of occurrence of the failure patterns is highly specific to
context and the observation method. Both Allen (2001) and Moubray (1997) note that the first
“bathtub” curve is a result of a combination of other failure patterns, consisting of failure events
of infant age, a period of random failures and sudden wear-out. Allen (2001) also suggests that
the third, constantly increasing failure pattern may also be a combination of multiple sudden
wear-out failure events of the second type. Generally speaking the more components in a system,
the more types of failure events it will have. If the system is thoroughly tested and run in after
installation, the design and installation errors are not shown and there are less 6th type infant
mortality failures.
39
5.3.3 Failure causes and effects
There is also a difficulty in differentiating the failure cause and effect. A manufacturing system,
whether a machine or a production line, usually comprises several components. Each component
has a certain inherent reliability and is exposed to external or internal failure events. These
components form a reliability network that defines the total reliability of the system. There may
be an almost infinite number of dynamic, static, operational, logistical, electrical, mechanical
and chemical connections that define the interdependencies of the network. The failure event of
one component may cause failure effects that look as failure events to other components. The
failure event may therefore propagate through the system causing a flow of failures for the
following components. E.g. a wear-out of an air compressor filter causes dirt to block a
pneumatic actuator which stops a production line.
The two failure events are dependent if and only if P[E1·E2] ≠ P[E1] x P[E2] (Villemeur,
1992).  That is, if the joint probability of two failure events does not equal the product of
individual probabilities of the events. According to Villemeur (1992) the categories of dependent
failure events are common cause events that have the same direct cause, and events that create
intersystem or intercomponent dependencies such as a failure of a redundant component. The
common cause event types can be divided into design, construction, operating and maintenance
procedures or environmental effects. Villemeur (1992) refers to several nuclear and aviation
failure databases indicating that the common cause failure events comprise 4-9 % of all the
failure events. Design errors are the most dominant (40-50 %) among the common cause failure
event types, followed by operating errors (30-45 %) and manufacturing and assembly errors (10
%).
The division of dependent or independent failures is highly specific to context and the
observation method. Generally speaking, a failure event that seems to be random is not
necessarily random, but may just be out of the methodological or observational accuracy.
Therefore, any comparison or judgement about failures or their causes should be very careful.
5.3.4 Partial failures
The concept of partial failures is well acknowledged by RCM, TPM and control engineering, but
not often noticed in reliability engineering. Partial failures are usually considered as performance
degradation or deterioration, and therefore modelled mathematically as continuous dynamical
systems, which is not in the field of study in reliability engineering. Instead, Markov chains
(Bukowski and Goble, 2001; Endrenyi et al., 2001; Wiseman, 1999) and lately also Petri Nets
(Schneeweiss, 2001), have been used to model the development and probability of occurrences
of system states.
Endrenyi et al. (2001) present a simple Markov chain-based model between the random total
failures, deterioration (partial) failures and proactive maintenance with two figures presented in
Figure 11. A simplification of continuous deterioration with intermediate discrete states makes
the failure process easier to model. There are two ways of defining the intermediate states: either
by operating time, which is an approximation of the real state, or physical signs, which requires
periodic inspections or continuous condition monitoring.
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M M1 M2 M3
Figure 11 State diagrams for total and partial failures (Endrenyi et al., 2001)  W:working state;
F:failed state; S:state; M:maintenance state.
The problem in this kind of a presentation is in deciding in which of states S1-S4 the machine is
considered failed. In the RCM approach the user may decide that S3 is a failed state. In reliability
engineering S4 is considered definitely a failed state and S1 definitely a working state. In TPM it
is agreed as in RCM that S3 may be a failed state, but the aim is to remain in state S1.
5.3.5 Subjective state definitions in the maintenance paradigms
In practice, there must be several organisations and paradigmatic approaches involved with a
production system. Emergency repairing, predictive maintenance, preventive maintenance,
system optimisation and operational system control all try to control the system states. The
allowable and satisfactory system states, however, differ in the various paradigms. Figure 12
tries to capture the paradigmatic approaches to the control of system states.
State Variable
State Variable
Total Failure Region
Absolute definition
Partial Failure Region
Defined by individual user requirements
Normal Operation Region
Defined by average capability 
of this machine
Best Possible Region
Defined by best known machine
CE
RCM
RE
Designed Operation Region
Defined by machine & process designerTPM
System Dynamics
Figure 12 Paradigmatic approaches to the control of system states. TPM tries to move the
operating state to optimal region, control engineering tries keep the status quo, RCM tries to
keep the operating state away from failure region, and reliability engineering tries to keep the
designed operating state. A total failure, meaning the total loss of a function, is the only common
failure state for all the paradigms. The solid arrows describe the system control approaches
emphasised by each paradigm and the dashed arrow is a system- dependent drift. In reality,
there may be more than two states defining the system state.
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5.4 EFFECTS OF INFORMATION IN FAILURE AND
MAINTENANCE PROCESSES
It was stated earlier that the number of appropriate maintenance action types the maintenance
system is able to use is limited by the information available of the machines under maintenance.
The statement is discussed in this chapter.
5.4.1 The observability and reversibility of black-box system states
Imagine that the machine or production line state is not observed other than after the actual
failure occurrences. Proactive control, i.e. preventive maintenance, would require a model of the
system failures.
If the internal states of the system are not known, the system can be modelled as a black box,
that has only two states. In that case, nothing needs to be known about the system internals. The
system seems to exhibit time-dependent behaviour or behaviour dependent on some other
external variable of the binary state changes, and can therefore be modelled with the help of
stochastic models. An example is the reliability engineering approach in which a machine is
either failed or not failed. A common approach to model such failures is to take the operating
time as the independent variable, and the failure rate as the dependent variable. The failure
patterns shown in Figure 10 are based on such models.
If the failures are binary states, then the application of a stochastic failure model for
preventive maintenance requires that a maintenance action restores the failure totally or to some
definite pre-failure state. In other words, the maintenance action can return the system only to
the beginning of the hazard curve or to some definite point along that curve as illustrated in
Figure 13. This reduces the number of appropriate maintenance action types, and suggests a total
restoration of the system.
Failure
Repair
Preventive Maintenance
Figure 13 In black-box systems it is assumed that maintenance always returns the system to the
hazard curve and that the form of the curve does not change due to maintenance.
The challenge in complex systems is that if the sub-systems are renewed separately, the whole
system will not be in the same state after the maintenance as it was before maintenance and the
model cannot be used in preventive maintenance programming. Therefore, the systems should be
divided into subsystems and the subsystems should be modelled separately.
5.4.2 Condition monitoring
If the system is monitored with a condition monitoring system, the system becomes a white or a
grey box system. In that case, the condition monitoring method restricts the variety of possible
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observable system states. The knowledge of which monitored system states are considered
failure states must exist in order to prevent the system from failing. The control engineering
paradigm assumes that a given system state should be maintained and therefore uses no explicit
definition of each failure state, but an explicit definition of the preferable operating state.
Consequently, the explicit definition of the preferable operating state excludes all the other states
and therefore becomes an explicit definition of one failure state.
According to Shannon (1948) by acquiring enough information even over a noisy
transmission channel it should be possible to obtain accurate information of a system state, and
therefore control the variety in the system states with the help of a given model. A system, in
which the system states are stochastic and the observations take place trough a stochastic process
as well, could be estimated by modelling the system with some advanced system identification
methods, such as hidden Markov models (Rabiner, 1989), proportional hazards models
(Wiseman, 1999) or stochastic filtering such as Kalman filters (Drécourt, 2003). Even though the
human brain does not operate similarly to computers, there is no doubt that a human brain can
also create similar system models unconsciously. Therefore, an experienced mechanic may know
quite accurately when the machine is going to fail based only on the machine age or human-
sensible parameters. On the other hand, a human error may affect the observation of the states.
To rely on human perception as an observation channel increases the risk that a person does not
recognise the system state or reports the observed system state subjectively. If the condition
monitoring is automated, the human transmission errors are reduced. Therefore, automatic
condition monitoring should help in developing better proactive maintenance programs
regardless of the applied modelling method.
The increased number of monitored system states makes it possible to apply a wider range of
maintenance actions than in an unobserved system. This is because the maintenance actions may
change the system state to a wider range of states, and the condition monitoring makes it
possible to know the exact state of the system. In practice, the human senses are such condition
monitoring systems. Therefore, more maintenance actions than in a theoretical unobserved
system should be expected in a real maintenance system. If electronic condition monitoring
methods that are able to sense system states beyond the human senses are applied, the number of
possible maintenance actions could be even wider than without electronic condition monitoring
methods.
Bukowski and Goble (2001) have defined a term diagnostics coverage to describe the
probability that a failure state can be recognised by a diagnostic system. Thus, any condition
monitoring method should be able to increase the diagnostic coverage. Because condition
monitoring increases the amount of information about the machines, there are more possibilities
to choose the right moment to undertake the correct maintenance action. Any misinformation,
false diagnostics or measurement inaccuracy reduces the possibility to select the correct timing
and type of maintenance action. In a perfect condition monitoring system the all the states are
observed correctly.
For the purposes of this dissertation term observability6 is defined as the conditional
probability that a machine state is observed correctly. I.e., P(o=s|s), where s ∈ S = {S0, S1, …,
Sn} is the true state and o ∈  S is the observed state. In a perfect condition monitoring system the
conditional probability P(o=s|s)=1,∀ s.
The assumption is that the data provided by the condition monitoring system is used as an
input for the maintenance system. A condition monitoring system without usage is worthless.
                                                     
6 Note that the definition of observability differs from the mathematical definition (Wolovich, 2000) in mathematical
control theory.
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5.4.3 Condition-based maintenance actions
Condition monitoring does not facilitate the system modelling. The level of modelling
granularity can be much finer in systems under condition monitoring than without condition
monitoring.
The question is why model a system if it is under condition monitoring? The answer is that
condition-based maintenance reacts to possible failures and prevents them from happening. The
preventive part of condition-based maintenance needs a model of the failure process. If the
condition monitoring is perfect and the failure prediction can be done early enough, then the
maintenance system is able to prevent all the failures. I.e, the failure states are avoided (MTTF =
∞) only when P(o=s|s)=1,∀ s, and when tf>ti, where ti is the initiation delay of the maintenance
action and tf is the shortest transition time between any working system state and any failure
state in S.
Under these conditions any maintenance action that reduces the variety  or constrains the
system state from being in the failure state  would be enough. But to know when and how to
act, the effects of both the maintenance actions and the failure processes on the system state
transitions should be modelled, implicitly or explicitly.
If the condition monitoring is not perfect then the system may enter in an unknown system
state as a result of variability in the maintenance actions. Furthermore, if not using condition
monitoring, a repeatable maintenance action is the only possibility to know the system state for
modelling failure transition time. In that case, it is even more important that the maintenance
action is repeatable and always results in a known system state. I.e. let M = (M0, …, Mn) and X
= (X0, …, Xn) be pairs of maintenance actions and the resulting system states X0…n ∈ S.  In case
where P(o=s|s)=0 the system state is known after maintenance only if conditional probability
P(Xj|Mj)=1, ∀ j=0, …,n. That is, perfectly repeatable maintenance is needed to "reset" the
system to a known state in order to model the system transitions.
In practise, when using condition monitoring the observability P(o=s|s) is between ]0,1[.
Therefore, observability, maintenance action initiation time and repeatability affect the
maintenance effectiveness, i.e. MTTF.
5.4.4 Information creation in failure and maintenance processes
Failure and maintenance processes are information processes. That is, the processes change the
input information into output information. The failure and maintenance processes are irreversible
in regard to information. A failure process loses information of the cause of the failure, and a
maintenance process loses information of the failure state. Generally speaking, it is not usually
possible to detect the input information by observing the output information of the information
process.
However, according to Losee (1998) the irreversible processes also produce information
about the process itself. That is, a human being may be able to model the process and the
required input information. By observing the failure states after failures and the operating states
after maintenance it is possible to get information about the behaviour of those processes. If
possible, the input information of the processes should be available, to help understand the
processes. E.g. it is useful to have failure reports before executing a maintenance action, and pre-
failure system status reports after failures to get information about the failure and maintenance
processes. It is also possible to estimate the possible outputs with the given inputs if there is a
finite set of possible processes. That is, with a detected system state it may be possible to predict
the failure state. The existence and behaviour of the processes may be difficult to estimate, and
therefore an experienced human is needed to create the scenarios.
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To explicitly define the failure states and to develop a proactive maintenance strategy it is
possible to begin from the existing maintenance actions, as in PM Optimization, from the
occurred failure states, as in TPM, or from the scenarios of possible failure states, as in RCM.
The information creation processes in the maintenance paradigms are different from each other.
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6 SYSTEM MODELS I-V
Maintenance systems appear to be very difficult to describe in written text. In this chapter, the
maintenance systems are therefore modelled with several methods in order to capture the
complexity and various views to the maintenance systems.
6.1 OVERVIEW OF SYSTEM MODELS I-V
Five models were developed during the research. Two of them are qualitative models describing
the relations of the entities and activities in the system. Three of the models are quantitative for
modelling the stochastic and dynamic behaviour of the maintenance systems. The overview of
the models is presented below.
Model I Knowledge model
A unified modelling language (UML) domain model of failure and
maintenance concepts for sharing the knowledge constructs
developed in the literature study and theory part of this
dissertation.
Model II Control activities model
An applied Gorry-Morton framework (Gorry and Morton, 1989)
for understanding the decision making and control activities in
maintenance systems.
Model III Stochastic maintenance system model
 A stochastic simulation model for studying the effect of condition
monitoring on the availability and total costs of maintenance
.
Model IV Dynamic maintenance system model
A dynamic simulation model for studying the effect of condition
monitoring and the maintenance quality on the reliability and
maintenance worker allocation.
Model V Dynamic supply chain model
A dynamic simulation model for studying the effect of remote
condition monitoring information feedback on the spare parts
supply chain.
6.2 SYSTEM MODEL I:  A UML DOMAIN MODEL OF
FAILURE AND MAINTENANCE CONCEPTS
6.2.1 Purpose of the model
The primary purpose of the model is to share the knowledge acquired during the research. The
secondary purpose is to develop a high-level conceptual domain model for future information
system development projects.
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6.2.2 Knowledge, ontology and information communication
To develop a knowledge model, a definition for knowledge should be stated. Kerr (1991, p. 65)
describes the knowledge about an environment or domain “as the set of organised constructs
possessed by an individual at any particular time in relation to a particular environment or
domain”. Any new data that modifies the knowledge structures of the recipient is regarded as
information. The knowledge is communicated between individuals by using messages that
convey abstract symbols with some syntax. The recipient can convert the symbols to knowledge
only by understanding the message syntax and by interpreting the symbols against an existing set
of mental constructs. An identical set of constructs, a shared context, is required between the
sender and the receiver to fully transfer knowledge. Two persons cannot have a fully identical
set of mental constructs, which makes full knowledge transfer impossible.
However, an explicit knowledge representation with the help of text or images may help in
improving the context sharing and therefore the communication of the information. Also,
subjective activities, such as failure diagnostics cannot be automated if the mental constructs of
the human decision making have not been modelled.
6.2.3 UML as a knowledge modelling methodology
From the point of view of information systems development this dissertation can be regarded as
an analysis of maintenance activities. Analysis is the first phase in information system
development. As an activity, the analysis consists of investigation of the problem and the
requirements. The difference between the analysis and the design is that the analysis does not
take into account how the system should be implemented but only what the system does. The
value of standard software engineering methodologies should be acknowledged in analysing the
existing information systems or in analysing the requirements for new information systems. To
serve the secondary purpose of the model, the knowledge should therefore be represented in a
format familiar to software engineering to enable its further usage in future information system
development projects.
A commonly used notation in software engineering is defined by UML. UML can be
regarded as a knowledge representation format, as well as a software design notation. The use of
UML in the analysis makes it possible to use unified process (UP) (Larman, 2002) as a software
development method. The dissertation research methodology does not enable the application of
the unified process as such. Instead, one of the central concepts was picked from the unified
process: the domain model.
The domain model is a description of things of interest in the real world and consists of a set
of conceptual classes, their associations and attributes modelled with UML class diagrams.
Larman (2002, p.129) defines domain models as “a visual dictionary of the noteworthy
abstractions, domain vocabulary, and information content of the domain.” Comparing to the
knowledge definition in Chapter 6.2.2 the domain model represents a knowledge model. The
classes in the domain models show real-world concepts. The domain model is an analyst’s view
of the domain, and it should be distinguished from the design view of the software classes.
However, the domain model can be used in designing the software classes of the
implementation. Therefore, the domain model communicates information about the domain and
reduces the representational gap between the software implementation and the mental domain
concepts of the analyst.
6.2.4 Validation of the UML model with a knowledge modelling tool
The UML domain model has one major drawback in domain modelling: No class instances can
be defined. That is, an instance such as "oil change" cannot be defined for a concept named
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"maintenance action". This makes it difficult to assess the validity of the model. Therefore, the
UML model was developed with the help of a special knowledge modelling tool (Protégé-2000
v1.7 from Stanford University). After changing the model in the knowledge modelling tool and
entering some sample class instances, the same changes were made to the UML model. Then the
UML model was simplified, and the same changes were made in the knowledge modelling tool.
This modelling methodology was surprisingly powerful. The knowledge modelling tool made it
possible to test the model with instance data, which helped in refining the model.
6.2.5 The UML domain model
The resulting UML domain model is presented in Figure 14.
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Figure 14 A domain model of failure and maintenance concepts.
The central concept is the system. A system can be connected to and from zero or more systems
representing the logical arrangements of the system. In other words, an engine may be connected
to an exhaust system. A system may have zero or more sub- and supersystems. That is, a
production line may consist of machines, and the machine may be a part of several production
lines. Each system has at least one purpose, that is the reason for the existence of the system. A
purpose may be implemented by at least one system. E.g. the purpose to generate power can be
implemented by a combustion engine or a gas turbine. A system may fail to a fault (failure state)
or due to a fault (failure event). An example screenshot of the system concept from the
knowledge modelling tool is shown in Figure 15. The structure is identical to the UML domain
model.
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Figure 15 A realisation of the system concept as represented by the knowledge modelling tool.
A fault represents both failure states and failure events. When entering instances in the
knowledge modelling tool the distinction between a failure state and failure event was so unclear
that the separation between them was very difficult. Instead, a less informative concept, namely
fault, was used. In other words, a fault is a possibility for or an existence of a failure event or
state. The idea that both state and event are kinds of faults is bit confusing. However, an event
represents a state change. Therefore, an event can be described with the resulting state or a state
with the event. It is just semantics to think with failure occurrences or existences. In the model, a
fault may cause zero or more consequent faults, or a fault may be caused by zero or more faults.
Each fault may have zero or more consequences, and each consequence is caused by at least one
fault. A consequence is applicable in at least one environment. E.g. a total loss of pulp
production capacity is applicable only in the paper making process. In an application
environment there may be several fault consequences. An example screenshot of the fault
concept from the knowledge modelling tool is shown in Figure 16.
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Figure 16  A realisation of the fault concept as represented by the knowledge modelling tool.
A condition monitoring system strives to monitor at least one fault, and a fault can be monitored
by zero or more condition monitoring methods. A maintenance action reacts to or prevents at
least one fault. Each fault must be reacted or prevented by zero or more maintenance actions. A
maintenance action requires at least one resource. A resource can be either material, such as
spare parts or tools, or the work skills of a worker. A resource must be required by at least one
maintenance action. Each maintenance action may have zero or more schedules. A schedule, e.g.
once per year, schedules at least one maintenance action. An example screenshot of the work
skill and schedule concepts from the knowledge modelling tool is shown in Figure 17.
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Figure 17 A realisation of the work skill resource and schedule concepts as represented by the
knowledge modelling tool.
The explicit definition of faults in the domain model refers to the RCM/FMEA thinking in which
the failure consequences cannot be defined if the failure state is not defined. Contrary to
RCM/FMEA the system is defined with a purpose rather than a function. However, a function or
a set of functions is needed for achieving the purpose. As stated earlier, a fault can be a cause or
an effect of other faults. The thinking here is aligned with the fault tree analysis (FTA) method
defined in IEC 61025 (1990). In the knowledge modelling tool the user can begin from any
system purpose or fault and create a fully compatible model to FMEA and FTA.
6.2.6 Summary
The presented knowledge model defines a structure for maintenance system models. The
modelling tool helps in creating a realisation of such a maintenance system model and ensures
that the system is valid. If there are discrepancies between the model and the actual system,
either one or the other is not valid. Therefore, the realised model should be modified according
to reality or the reality can be analysed and corrected. By adding quantitative failure and
maintenance models and by connecting the tool to a CMMS it would be possible to create an
efficient real-time maintenance planning tool.
6.3 SYSTEM MODEL II: A GORRY-MORTON
INFORMATION SYSTEMS FRAMEWORK
6.3.1 Purpose of the model
The failure and maintenance processes are very complex and unpredictable despite the vast
variety of methodologies and paradigms that can be applied to control the processes. The
applicability of information technology depends on how much human intelligence can be
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replaced with artificial intelligence (AI) and what kind of requirements AI places on the
availability and quality of the information for making the necessary decisions.
The UML domain model presented in Chapter 6.2 presents the knowledge constructs of
maintenance systems. The constructs, however, do not tell how the maintenance systems are
controlled. The purpose of the model is to understand the complexity of decision making and
control activities in maintenance systems.
6.3.2 Artificial intelligence
Even though the scope of this research does not cover the implementation of information
systems, some characteristics of intelligence should be defined in order to understand the control
possibilities of maintenance systems.
According to Turban and Aronson (1998) artificial intelligence is concerned with two basic
ideas. Firstly, it involves understanding what intelligence is by studying the thinking processes
of humans, and secondly, it deals with representing those processes in computers. The signs of
intelligence include learning and understanding, responding quickly to a new situation, using
reasoning in solving problems, making sense of contradictory messages and applying knowledge
to manipulate the environment. Kaplan (1984) has defined several important commercial
advantages of artificial intelligence over natural intelligence: AI is more permanent, offers ease
of duplication, can be less expensive than natural intelligence, is consistent and thorough, can be
documented, can execute certain tasks much more quickly than a human, and can perform
certain tasks better than most humans. However, according to Kaplan (1984) natural intelligence
has several advantages over AI: Natural intelligence is creative, enables people to benefit from
and use sensory experience directly, and human reasoning makes use of a wide context of
experiences and brings that to work on individual problems.
Natural intelligence enables people to recognise relationships between things, sense qualities
and spot patterns to make relationship recognising possible. These are very difficult to program
in AI. Kaplan's (1984) definitions suggest that the problems that an AI system can solve must be
well structured and repetitive. Complex and unstructured problems require human intelligence.
6.3.3 The Gorry-Morton framework
The most complete knowledge and system-control related information system model found
during the literature study was a framework for management information systems of Gorry and
Morton (1989). The framework shown in Table 3 is based on the problem classification into
structured and unstructured types, as well as the time-horizon of the decisions.
Operational Control Management Control
(Tactical planning)
Strategic Planning
Structured • Accounts receivable
• Order entry
• Inventory control
• Budget analysis
• Short-term
forecasting
• Tanker fleet mix
• Warehouse and
factory location
• Production
scheduling
• Variance analysis –
overall budget
• Mergers and
acquisitions
Unstructured • Cash management
PERT/COST
systems
• Budget preparation
• Sales and
production planning
• New product
planning
• R&D planning
Table 3 Management information systems framework (Gorry and Morton, 1989).
A structured problem is one in which the intelligence, design and choice phases of the problem
solving are structured. In other words, there are algorithms or decision rules that make it possible
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to find the problem, design the solution alternatives, and select the best solution. Operational
control systems include repetitive and pre-programmed actions that deal with accurate, internal
and current or historical data, whereas strategic planning is long-range, infrequent, predictive
and uses mainly aggregated and external data. Typical corporate information systems reside on
the upper left corner of the framework. The information systems that deal with unstructured
problems are usually decision support systems.
The main problem in implementing an information system in structured operational areas is
to adapt the existing model to the organisation. Information system design in the unstructured
areas is more involved with the structuration and modelling of the problem and the problem
solving process rather than the implementation problem. The modelling and structuring of the
unstructured problems make it possible to automatically or semiautomatically solve problems
that would otherwise require a human expert. Gorry and Morton (1989) emphasise the
importance of understanding the critical decisions made by the organisation in order to create
information systems that deal with unstructured problems.
According to Schoderbek et al. (1990, p. 118) "decision making and control are similar, if
not identical managerial activities. Both activities are initiated and maintained through
communication." This statement suggests that the entire framework of Gorry and Morton is
essentially a control system framework with regard to the control time horizon of the system and
the degree of structure of the control decisions.
6.3.4 Applying the Gorry-Morton framework to maintenance systems
According to the literature study, the framework of Gorry and Morton (1989) has not been
applied to maintenance systems. Therefore, maintenance-related concepts and methodologies
were placed in the framework in order to analyse both the time frame and control decision
complexity of the system. Inspired by the version of the original framework Turban and Aronson
(1998) present in their book, an additional column named "applicable methods" that describes
what kind of methods exist to make decisions or to help make them in maintenance systems was
added. The resulting framework with transitions from reactive to preventive maintenance, and
from preventive to condition-based maintenance is presented in Table 4.
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Operational
Control
Tactical planning Strategic
Planning
Applicable
Methods
Structured • Work order
entry
• Cost reporting
• Condition
monitoring
• Maintenance
direct costs
budgeting
• Inventory and
workforce
planning
• Quantitative
models
• Analytical
models
• Operations
research
Semistructured • Maintenance
workflow
control
• Inventory
control
• Root cause
analysis
• Preventive
maintenance
work
scheduling
• Fault tree
analysis
• Maintenance
work planning
• Failure
effects and
consequence
analysis
• Run-to-
failure or use
preventive
maintenance
• Descriptive
models
• Process and
event models
Unstructured • Failure
diagnostics
• Machine repair
• Failure
prognostics
• Failure mode
analysis
• Long-term
maintenance
planning
• Heuristics
• Decision
support
systems
• Expert
systems
• Neural
networks
Table 4 A maintenance information system framework and the transitions from reactive (lower-
left circle) to preventive maintenance (middle-right circle), and from preventive to condition-
based maintenance (upper-left circle).
By analysing the framework it is obvious that CMMS functionality lies on the operational-
tactical timescale dealing mostly with structured-semistructured issues. Condition monitoring is
also a structured activity in the operations control, because it is frequently repeated and focuses
on the current state of the system. Preventive maintenance is semi- or unstructured and affects
future system states in the medium or long-range time horizon. Therefore, when operating with
structured and current information, condition monitoring may enable more accurate maintenance
activities than preventive maintenance. However, the diagnostics and prognostics of the failures
still remain on the unstructured level implying that human intelligence is needed in deciding
what kind of actions a detected system state requires.
RCM and TPM seem to be paradigms that deal with semistructured and unstructured
problems in the failure-maintenance system, whereas reliability engineering and control
engineering are structured approaches. Therefore, a mix of the methods and paradigms in real-
world maintenance is necessary. Without applying several different methods and paradigms the
control of the system would be difficult because of the missing decision making methodologies.
Ashby’s (1957) statement that only variety in the regulating system can force down variety due
to the controlled system applies in the failure and maintenance processes. This also implies that
there is no "silver bullet", e.g. a paradigm, policy or methodology, that would solve all the
problems related to maintenance systems.
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6.4 SYSTEM MODEL III: A STOCHASTIC
MAINTENANCE SYSTEM SIMULATION MODEL
6.4.1 Purpose of the model
The stochastic simulation model applies reliability engineering paradigms and can be used to
calculate the approximate effect of reactive, preventive and condition-based maintenance on the
total maintenance costs, reliability and operational availability. A comparison of differences in
the maintenance policies caused by cost-, reliability- and availability-driven maintenance system
control can therefore be made. The novelty of the simulation model is the possibility to mix both
condition-based and preventive maintenance policies to simulate operational availability and
costs. The model can be partly verified with a numerical calculation method presented prior to
the simulation model.
6.4.2 Overview and assumptions
The basic assumption of the model is that the single unit system under maintenance always
returns functionally and structurally to as good as new. In addition to that, the model applies
only to one failure state of that component. The application of the model to some machine or
production line requires explicit definitions of the failure states. The modelling and simulation
tool was Mathcad 2001i by Mathsotft Inc. The full model is presented in Appendix B: Model III
in Mathcad 2001i format.
The simulation model assumes that the occurrence of the failure state follows a two-
parameter Weibull rate (NIST/SEMATECH, 2002)
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and the cumulative probability of failures follow a cumulative Weibull distribution function
(NIST/SEMATECH, 2002)
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where x is the time in days, β is the shape parameter and η is the scale parameter. The Weibull
distribution is a special case of extreme value distribution (Høyland and Rausand, 1994) and is
widely being used in modelling failure probabilities because of its flexibility in curve fitting. All
the major failure patterns including decreasing, constant and increasing failure rates can be
modelled with the Weibull distribution. Also, the Weibull parameters for generic machine types
are commercially available (Barringer, 2003). Application of other probability distributions is
possible, since the simulation does not use the analytical properties of the Weibull distribution.
The simulation model assumes that there is some average utilisation (Ut) of the machine in
relation to calendar time. In case of a failure the mean repair time will be MTTR days, and
proactive maintenance, i.e. condition-based and preventive maintenance, takes on average
MTTM days to execute. The cost information needed includes
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• component price (cco)
• repair work costs (cre)
• proactive maintenance work costs (cma)
• daily lost capacity expenses of proactive maintenance (cdcap)
• daily increased operating expenses caused by a failure (cdop)
• daily increased quality expenses caused by a failure (cdqu)
• daily lost capacity expenses caused by a failure (cdcar)
Therefore, the long-run mean yearly total costs of maintenance is given by( ) ( )[ ] mccMTTRcdcdcdnMTTMcdccmnfc corecarquopcapmaco ⋅++⋅+++⋅⋅++=),(
 (6)
where n is the number of proactive maintenance actions and m is the number of repairs during a
year.
6.4.3 Numerical method of a preventively maintained system
With a given maintenance interval MTBM in operation days and failure rate function (4) it is
possible to calculate both the number of failures and the number of preventive maintenance
actions. The model is suitable for verifying this particular simulation model, although a more
elegant solution for calculating the failure and maintenance frequencies can be derived from the
renewal theory (Høyland and Rausand, 1994, p. 292).
The calculation assumes that the preventive maintenance action changes the failure rate to
the same level as a new system after each MTBM operating days. This is described by the
following cumulative distribution function (Virtanen and Hagmark, 2002) if a Weibull
distribution is applied:
∫−−=
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where mod(x, MTBM) represents the modulo operator that takes the remainder on dividing x by
MTBM. This results in a curve type shown in Figure 18.
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Figure 18 Cumulative failure probability of a preventively maintained Weibull system (7) with
MTBM=2700, β=2.5, η=4167.
The mean time to failure (MTTF) needed in the calculation is given by numerically integrating
the reliability function from zero to infinity (Høyland and Rausand, 1994)
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The MTTF value does not equal the MTTF of a machine but the MTTF of the function that may
be implemented by several machines replaced by preventive maintenance.
The probability that a failure is observed during the first MTBM interval is
CDFM(MTBM, 1·MTBM)-CDFM(MTBM,0). The probability that a failure is observed during
the 2nd MTMB interval is CDFM(MTBM,2·MTBM)-CDFM(MTBM, 1·MTBM) and so on. By
multiplying the probabilities by the respective number of maintenance actions gives the expected
value for the number of preventive maintenance actions per failure (mf):
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which can also be written as
m
nmf = (10)
where n and m are the number of preventive and reactive maintenance actions during a year.
The mean calendar time to reach the first repaired failure (MTTFR) is given by
MTTR
Ut
MTTFMTTMnMTTFR ++⋅= (11)
where Ut is the average machine utilization. The number of reactive maintenance actions, and
therefore the number of failures during a year is given by
MTTFR
m 365=  (12)
The group of the three previous equations (10, 11, 12) can be solved to calculate number of
reactive maintenance actions during a year:
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With m it is easy to calculate the n with the help of (10), and the yearly costs of maintenance
with (6). For analysis purposes also the operational availability is defined according to Chapter
5.2.3:
365
)(365 MTTMnMTTRmAo
⋅+⋅−= (14)
It is assumed that the production process is operating 24 hours per day and 7 days per week. If
not, then the MTTR and MTTM as well as the number of production days, 365, should be
adjusted according to the production schedule. No method for calculating OEE is presented
because the quality and capacity losses are calculated directly with the cost function.
The numerical calculation method presented in this chapter is suitable to reactive-preventive
maintenance, but the effect of condition monitoring is difficult to implement in the presented
equations. Also, the numerical calculation of integrals and sums is quite slow. Therefore, the
method presented in this chapter was used only to verify the simulation results of the simulation
model presented in the next chapter.
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6.4.4 Simulation model of a preventively maintained system under
condition monitoring
Usually, condition monitoring is assumed to be able to detect the failure state 100 % reliably (i.e.
Dieulle et al., 2001; Maillart and Pollock, 2002) or the condition monitoring reliability is
assumed time-invariant (Bukowski and Goble, 2001). Also, condition-based maintenance is
usually assumed to replace preventive maintenance as the maintenance policy. In reality these
assumptions are not always valid. For example, paper roll bearings are sometimes replaced even
if they are under condition monitoring. This implies either that the condition monitoring method
is not fully reliable or that the condition monitoring detects the failure too late.
In the simulation model, condition monitoring is assumed to be able to detect the future
failure state with some certainty (DC) [0 % ...100 %], which is called diagnostic coverage
(Bukowski and Goble, 2001). If the failure is detected, the detection time (DT) is the time
between the found indication of a future failure state and the actual occurrence of the failure.
In reality, there is likely to be some dependence between DT and DC. That is, the mean
detection time is longer with higher diagnostics coverage, and vice versa. But, because it may be
possible to adjust the sensitivity of the diagnostics there may be an increasing number of false
diagnostics alarms if DC and DT are increased. These aspects are not included in this model but
considered later in Model IV.
In addition to cost parameters in the previous chapter, there is an additional cost of one
condition monitoring inspection (ci), and the monitoring interval parameter, mean operating time
between inspections (MTBI). If using automatic condition monitoring as assumed in this
research, both ci and MTBI can be approximated as zeros. If applying the model in highly
integrated process industries where a machine can be maintained only during some fixed
maintenance breaks, there must be some factor that defines what the average time is from the
detection of a failure to the next possible moment when the maintenance can be executed
without interrupting the process. This time interval, mean operating time to arrange a
maintenance break (MTTAM), may also be defined by the availability of suitable spare parts or
maintenance planning and scheduling delay.
The simulation model uses two-parameter Gamma probability distribution
xexxPDF λα
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where α is the scale parameter, λ is the rate parameter and Γ is the Gamma function to model the
probability of detecting the failure DT days before its occurrence. Use of other distributions is
possible, e.g. Beta distribution, which is very flexible and suitable for modeling expert estimated
data (Fente et al., 1999). In the simulation, the distribution is formed by user-given parameters
for mode (the peak value), median, 10 % and 90 % confidence levels for the detection times. The
mode value is fixed as it is easiest to estimate (Fente et al., 1999). The least squares method is
used to fit the Gamma distribution to the given points. An example of such distribution is given
in Figure 19.
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Figure 19 A Gamma probability distribution (15) with scale parameter α=2 and rate parameter
λ=0.05 to model the failure detection time as a function of probability. The curve area on the
right of the MTTAM line defines what the probability is that the failure is detected earlier than
the time it takes to arrange maintenance (MTTAM=15 d).
An inverse of the cumulative Weibull failure distribution (5) as well as an inverse cumulative
Gamma distribution are used in the simulation by feeding random probabilities between values 0
and 1 to the functions. The functions return the simulated operating time to the next failure and
the detection time to detect the failure. The simulation proceeds as follows
1: take a random number between 0 and 1 and simulate the next failure time in operating days by using an
inverse function of Equation 5 in respect to time x and sum it to previous failure or maintenance time
2: determine the next preventive maintenance by adding mean operating time between failure (MTBM) to
previous failure or maintenance time
3: if the simulated failure time is before the next preventive maintenance time, that is the system is going
to fail, then
4: take a random number between 0 and 1
5: if the random number is less than DC, that is, the diagnostics detect the failure, then
6: take a random number between 0 and 1 and use inverse cumulative
Gamma distribution to simulate how many operating days before the
failure it is detected
7: adjust the time of detection by selecting the next condition monitoring
time defined by the mean operating time between inspections (MTBI)
from the previous failure or maintenance time
8: if the failure time minus detection time is greater than  the mean
calendar time to arrange maintenance (MTTAM) then
9: the system fails at the failure time because the
maintenance cannot be executed before the failure
else
10: the predictive maintenance time is the detection time
plus MTTAM
else
11: the system fails at the failure time because the diagnostics cannot
detect the failure
else
12: the preventive maintenance is executed before the failure and the maintenance time is
given by the previous failure or maintenance time plus MTBM
13: go back to step 1 until enough maintenance and failure events have been simulated
MTTAM
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It is possible to count the number of proactive maintenance actions from the simulation results
and apply (6) and (14) to calculate the average total costs of the maintenance and the average
operational availability of the system.
6.4.5 Simulation results
To study the effect of condition monitoring a fictive electrical motor was used with Weibull
failure curve defined by β=2 and η= 4166.667 (Barringer, 2003) which analytically calculating
gives as the mean time to fail MTTF=3696.933 operating days. The preventive maintenance
interval MTBM was set at 2700 operating days and the diagnostics coverage DC at 75 % of the
failures detected, if applied. Both the maintenance (MTTM) and repair (MTTR) take 5 calendar
days. The cost information used was as follows:
• motor price cco=10,000
• repair work costs cre=2,000
• proactive maintenance work costs cma=1,000
• daily lost capacity expenses in case of proactive maintenance cdcap=0
• daily increased operating expenses caused by a failure cdop=0
• daily increased quality expenses caused by a failure cdqu=0
• daily lost capacity expenses caused by a failure cdcar=10,000
The proactive maintenance is not assumed to cause any capacity loss expenses (cdcap=0) to
contrast the differences between cost and availability-driven maintenance system control. The
cdcap would be significant only in a situation where the proactive maintenance would cause loss
of sales. In case of repair or maintenance the motor is replaced with a renewed one. The repair
work is assumed more expensive than proactive maintenance because of the overtime work
costs. Proactive maintenance is assumed to be arranged immediately (MTTAM=0), so that the
detection time curve has no effect.
Four maintenance policies were studied: reactive only, preventive only, condition-based and
preventive, and condition-based only. The results are presented in Table 5 and Figure 20 with
1,000,000 years of simulation.
Ao Costs / year MTTF (days) Failures / Year
Reactive 99.892 % 4892.0 3696.8 0.079
Preventive 99.838 % 3023.7 8631.3 0.034
Preventive & CBM 99.837 % 1735.4 34576.9 0.008
CBM 99.891 % 1880.3 14770.5 0.020
Table 5 Simulation results of four different maintenance policies.
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Figure 20 The simulated cumulative failure probability distributions (solid lines) of preventive
only (upper-left), preventive & condition-based (upper-right), and condition-based only (lower-
left) policies compared to numerically calculated reactive policy (dotted lines) from (5).
If using operational availability as the efficiency metrics, the optimal policy is reactive and the
most inoptimal one is a combination of preventive and condition-based maintenance. On the
other hand, using total costs as the metrics reverses the situation: the optimal policy is the
combination of preventive and condition-based and the most inoptimal one is the reactive
maintenance policy. The reason for that is the different weighting of the failures and proactive
maintenance. If using MTTF (reliability) as the metrics, the optimal and inoptimal policies are
the same as in using costs as the measurement method. This is because, similarly to MTTF
calculation, the applied cost data does not calculate the downtime caused by preventive
maintenance in as a cost.
The optimum values for both the costs and MTTF are achieved when the diagnostics
coverage is 100 % and the maintenance can be arranged immediately (MTTAM=0). In that case
the costs are 876.2, operational availability is 99.891 % and MTTF is infinite. The lower
operational availability than in reactive maintenance is explained by the fact that the diagnostics
detect the failure some time before its occurrence. This leaves some safety margin in the average
lifetime of the system, which cannot be used in production as opposed to the case of reactive
maintenance that utilises the all the possible production time.
The failure rate was increasing, so these results do not apply to decreasing and constant
failure rates. Decreasing and constant failure rates cannot be reduced by preventive renewals. In
these cases, condition-based maintenance is the only option to reactive maintenance, except for
the situation where the failure cause is not affected by the system design. In that case, it may be
possible to prevent the failure event with some external preventive action, such as operator
training.
The simulation results imply that the method of measuring the maintenance process can
radically affect the maintenance policy selection. Especially, if operational availability is used
as the efficiency metrics and the condition monitoring is not perfect, then there is a risk to
62
overvalue condition-based maintenance over preventive maintenance and reactive maintenance
over condition-based and preventive maintenance.
6.4.6 The effect of limited time to diagnose
If using 15 days as the mean operating time to arrange maintenance (MTTAM) and the detection
time curve shown in Figure 19, the numerically calculated percentage for the components that
could not be proactively maintained in time would be 17.3 % of the detected failing components.
Therefore, with 75 % diagnostic coverage, 62.0 % of all the failures could be avoided. This
could be used as an approximation of diagnostics coverage with zero days MTTAM to get
similar results.
In highly integrated process industries the MTTAM is defined by the scheduled maintenance
breaks. The production process cannot be stalled right away if condition monitoring indicates
failure. In highly parallel production systems, such as cell production, there are no such
restrictions. Therefore the MTTAM is merely defined by the spare parts availability and the
throughput time of the maintenance process workflow. In the previous example, dropping the
MTTAM from 15 days to 10 days increases the percentage of avoided failures from 62 % to 68.2
%.
Reduction of the maintenance process throughput time and condition monitoring have an
amplifying effect on each other to increase reliability in situations where the maintenance
process cycle time limits arranging a maintenance break. However, the scale of the amplification
is dependent on the detection time, diagnostics coverage and the maintenance process throughput
time.
6.4.7 Summary
In the example simulation, the application of condition monitoring increased reliability
compared to the reactive and preventive maintenance policies. However, the condition-based
maintenance with limited diagnostics coverage (observability) was not the optimal policy.
The presented model used only one failure type so the comparison between maintenance
actions was not done. However, if preventive replacement or renewal was the only maintenance
action, adding additional failure types to the model would reduce the effectiveness of preventive
maintenance even more. This is because prevention of one failure type with renewal would be
quite likely inoptimal in regard to other failure types.
The example simulation shows that the measurement metrics of maintenance system affect
the applied maintenance policy. Such metrics as operational availability seems to favour
irrational maintenance policies that are usable only in special cases.
Because the detection time DT reduces the ability to do the maintenance action on the
detected failure in time, it is feasible to shorten the maintenance process throughput time with
such technologies as computerised maintenance management systems in order to reduce the
production losses in case of failures.
6.5 SYSTEM MODEL IV: A DYNAMIC MAINTENANCE
SYSTEM SIMULATION MODEL
6.5.1 Purpose of the model
The purpose of the model is to analyse the effect of the control system, condition monitoring,
maintenance repeatability and worker resources to the dynamics of maintenance systems. Of the
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presented models, this is dynamically the most complex one. The model is based on the theory
part and models derived so far. The dynamics cannot be predicted from the equations that define
the model structure, and therefore the model helps in revealing the behaviour of maintenance
systems.
6.5.2 Dynamic modelling
Dynamic models have their roots in system thinking and system control with information
feedback. The origins of the applied modelling method are in the classic Forrester (1961) book.
The modelling method emphasises studying the effect of the system structure and decisions on
the behaviour of the system. The three basic modelling elements are levels that describe the state
of the system, rates of flows that connect the levels and decision functions that control the rates.
Levels accumulate the incoming and outgoing rates, e.g. they represents such concepts as liquid
tanks, stocks of materials or awareness levels. Rates represent instantaneous flows of materials,
money, orders, persons and equipment. These flows are interconnected by information networks
which are also systems of levels, rates and decision functions. The decision functions represent
policies in the system, which define how the levels (system state) affect the rates.
6.5.3 Simplifications and assumptions in dynamic modelling
Common approaches to model failures and maintenance of production systems are to use either
stochastic simulation or Markov state-space models. These approaches are feasible considering
that the maintenance systems are by nature probabilistic and they may contain several possible
states. Although stochastic simulation is very flexible with the application of various probability
distributions, the drawback of stochastic simulation is usually its heavy requirements for
computing power. Markov models are efficient, but they have limitations with life- and
maintenance-time distributions and with taking into account trends such as seasonal changes.
Dynamic simulation models are good what comes to modelling non-linear dynamic systems
with large amounts of objects that flow from a state to another. In that case it is not feasible to
analytically calculate or stochastically simulate the state of each single object in the system.
Although the events in the maintenance systems may be discrete, such as sudden unexpected
failures, there are lots of continuous and interacting processes, such as degradation and repairing
of machines and moving the spare parts from a location to another. Therefore, continuous
approximations can often be made. The probabilistic nature of failures is "noise" from dynamic
simulation point of view. The proportion of noise becomes smaller and smaller compared to the
average failure rate when the number of independent machines increases. Therefore, the
maintenance system is simplified so that the stochastic behaviour of failures is assumed as a
deterministic function of the average age of the component population. The maintenance and
repair times are assumed similarly deterministic without probabilistic behaviour, because the
variability is very small compared to the overall system delays. The fundamental difference
compared to the stochastic simulation and Markov models is that instead of tracking the states of
each component, the interest is in the number of components in each state and in the flow rates
between the states. Because the model is continuous there may be fractions of components in
each state.
The dynamic models are usually adequate to describe the behaviour of the simulated process.
However, the correctness of the model structure and outputs is very difficult to show, even in
cases where actual data of process parameters and outputs is available (Graham et al., 2002). The
presented model makes no exception in that sense. Use of the model in real maintenance system
optimisation would require more rigorous analysis and calibration of the model parameters.
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6.5.4 Model overview
The model was developed with Vensim PLE v5.0 by Ventana Systems Inc. and is presented in
full in Appendix C: Model IV in Vensim 5.0 text format. The modelled system is a fictive one,
but should nevertheless roughly represent maintenance of deteriorating machines that have infant
failure characteristics caused by poor maintenance and repair repeatability. The system
parameter values are selected so that they could represent a real system  except for some
values that are set intuitively too small or too large to make the system behaviour clearly visible.
6.5.5 Component failure and maintenance model
The system maintains a set of components. They can be thought to be of the same type
representing a group of machines being maintained by a machine manufacturer. The components
may be in states S0…S8 that are defined by the number of components in that state. A simulator
view of the component model is presented in Figure 21. The component states and the
characteristic delays defining the system dynamics are presented in Table 6.
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Figure 21 The component model as seen in the simulator. Rectangles represent levels, valve
symbols represent flow rates, curved arrows represent information between decision functions,
and elbowed arrows represent possible paths between the levels. Repair work start rate, PM
work start rate and CBM work start rate are calculated in a worker allocation model.
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State Description Characteristic state delay
S0 Number of working components Defined by the average age of
components by equation (16) and
the renewal delay by equation
(19)
S1 Number of components that fail soon 12 weeks failure delay
S2 Number of failed components due to deterioration 1 week administration delay
S3 Number of components under repair 3 weeks repair delay
S4 Number of failed components due to infant failures 1 week administration delay
S5 Number of components that fail in their infant life 5 weeks infant failure delay
S6 Number of failing components to be maintained 1 week administration delay and
8 weeks detection delay
S7 Number of components under maintenance 4 weeks maintenance delay
S8 Number of working components to be maintained 1 week administration delay
Table 6 The component states and the characteristic delays.
6.5.6 Worker allocation model
The components are being maintained by a 30-person group of workers who can be in three
modes: idling, repairing, and executing proactive maintenance. The respective states are
W0…W2 that are defined by the number of workers in that mode. The state for the preventive
and condition-based maintenance actions is the same (W2) and requires one worker and four
weeks to complete. Repairing (W1) can be done in three weeks, but requires on average two
persons to complete. The administrative delay from start to end of a maintenance or repair task is
one week. This time is spent in such activities as travelling, diagnosing the failures, and
reporting the maintenance tasks. A simulator view of the worker allocation model is presented in
Figure 22. The worker allocation states, characteristic delays and number of workers required to
complete are presented in Table 7.
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W0
W2
W1
Figure 22 The worker allocation model as seen in the simulator. PM work start rate is defined in
the control model.
 State Description  Characteristic state delay Workers required
to complete
W0 Number of idle workers 1 week administration delay
W1 Number of repair workers 3 weeks repair delay 2 workers
W2 Number of proactive
maintenance workers
4  weeks maintenance delay 1 worker
Table 7  The worker states, the characteristic delays and the required number of workers.
6.5.7 Deterioration failure process
It is assumed that there are one thousand components (C=1000) in the system. They are normally
in a working state (S0). However, due to deterioration they fail. The failure rate is a function of
the average age of the components in operation. This is a rough simplification and does not take
the age distribution of the components into account, but nevertheless illustrates the effect of the
population age on the failure rate. The deterioration failure process is defined with a modified
Weibull failure rate
1
),(
−


⋅⋅=
β
ηη
βλ xccx (16)
where x is the average age of the components and c is the number of working components.
The used shape and scale parameters β=5 and η=566 make the curve steeply increasing to
denote the effect of the high average age on the failures. Equation (16) and the shape and scale
parameter values are fictive. The failure process can be considered to be formed from c equally
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old components that each have a failure pattern defined with a Weibull failure rate where β=5
and η=566, which make the component MTTF equal to 520 weeks. A ten-year lifetime for an
industrial machine is quite common (Barringer, 2003).
The component state changes from working components (S0) to components that fail soon
(S1) according to the deterioration process. The components that fail soon (S1) fail in average 12
weeks unless detected by an automatic condition monitoring and diagnostics system that has an
average 8-week fixed detection time before the failure. If the diagnostics does not detect the
failure, the component fails to the failed components due to deterioration state (S2) after eight
weeks.
6.5.8 Repair process
The failed components are taken under the components under repair state (S3) if there are two
workers available for that. The repair takes three weeks plus one additional week for
administrative delays. If the repair is successful, the component is restored back to the working
components state (S0). Thinking this way, the components are restored without the use of
materials. Or, one may think that the component represents a function that can be in the
previously described states, and the maintenance restores the function with the help of spare
parts or new components that are immediately available from a local inventory.
6.5.9 Repeatability of repair actions
The repair may be unsuccessful with 10 % probability, in which case the component is taken into
operation but is in the components that fail in their infant life state (S5). In other words, the
repeatability of the repair is 90 %. The average time the components operate in that state is five
weeks after which the component fails to the failed components due to infant failures state (S4).
The component is again repaired if there are two workers available. The selected repeatability
rate may be too low if it were compared to the repair repeatability of real systems. However, the
system behaviour is more easily visible with such parameter value selection.
6.5.10 Condition-based maintenance process
If the condition monitoring system detects the deterioration failure, the component is put in the
failing components to be maintained state (S6). If there is one worker available for condition-
based maintenance, the component is moved to the components under maintenance state (S7). In
any case, the repair has a higher priority than condition-based maintenance and may cause a
shortage of worker resources to condition-based maintenance of the components. The condition-
based maintenance has, however, a higher priority than preventive maintenance. From the
components under maintenance state (S7) the component proceeds as in preventive maintenance
described in the next chapter. The condition monitoring may be tuned to be too sensitive and
cause false alarms. This is modelled as a fixed ratio of the detected failures rate. In case of false
condition monitoring alarms the component is moved from the working components state (S0) to
the working components to be maintained state (S8). The user cannot observe that state, so the
components in that state are processed with the same priority as the failing components to be
maintained (S6).
6.5.11 Preventive maintenance process
To prevent the deterioration failures the maintenance system may renew some proportion of the
working components to decrease the average age of the components. The components are
changed to the components under maintenance state (S7) if there is one worker available for
preventive maintenance. In any case, the repair and condition-based maintenance have a higher
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priority and may cause a shortage of worker resources to preventive maintenance of the
components. The maintenance succeeds with 95 % probability, i.e. the repeatability of the
maintenance actions is 95 %. After successful maintenance the component is returned to the
working components state (S0). If the maintenance is not successful, the component is moved to
the components that fail in their infant life state (S5) and consequently, it will participate in the
repair process.
6.5.12 Preventive maintenance control model
Selecting a predefined preventive maintenance interval in the model is based on the assumption
that there is some target control variable. This kind of an optimum setpoint value may come
from such a model as presented in Chapter 6.4. In the model the controlled variable is defined by
)( fifdr nnnCY ++−= (17)
where C is the total number of components, nr  is the number of components being repaired (S3),
nfd  is the number of components that have failed because of deterioration (S2) and nfi is the
number of components failed because of infant failures (S4).
Considering the scope of this dissertation in process industries, the indirect costs of failures
are assumed relatively high compared to the costs of proactive maintenance. Therefore,
proactive maintenance is preferred and the components under proactive maintenance are not
included in (17). That is, the goal is not to control the operational availability but the reliability
(MTTF).
The logic is to take the controlled reliability variable Y and compare it to a setpoint of a
desired value. The difference, or error, between the actual value and the setpoint is controlled by
changing the preventive maintenance rate of the working components. The error equation is
defined as
SYE −= (18)
where S is the setpoint number of components, or the reliability target.
Selection of the preventive maintenance interval proceeds as follows: if the error E is
positive, increase the maintenance interval to decrease reliability and therefore reduce Y. If the
error E is negative, decrease the maintenance interval. If the error E is zero, then the required
level is achieved and no control action is needed. Control of the interval is continuous but the
changes are assumed very small. In practice the randomness in the failure process makes it
difficult to estimate the actual error value. Therefore, the measurements must be filtered to
obtain the real error E.
The selected approach to model the control logic is a proportional-integral (PI) control
algorithm (Åström and Hägglund, 2000) that is commonly used in industrial process control.
The use of the PI-algorithm does not imply that in reality the preventive maintenance is
controlled by using a PI-algorithm. Merely, the PI-algorithm simulates the real world decision
making and learning in which the system reliability is controlled with the help of some heuristic
and mental processes. Usage of both proportional and integral control parameters filters high-
frequency error signals out and ensures that the error will eventually be zero. A derivative
parameter is not used because its prediction capability by linear extrapolation is not very
effective in slow processes.
Error E is used to control the renewal delay, e.g. the weeks to renew all the components, with
the PI equation (Åström and Hägglund, 2000) in parallel form:
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where the MTTF of a component is 520 weeks, Gp = 100 is the proportional error gain and Gi =2
is the integral error gain. In other words, the error of one component causes one hundred weeks’
change in the renewal delay, and one component-week integral error causes two weeks’ change
in the renewal delay. These values were selected by testing the system so that there is some, but
not excessive oscillation in the preventive maintenance work start rate. Thus, the system is
appropriately tuned.
The minimum and maximum rates for the renewal delay are 0.4⋅MTTF and 1⋅MTTF of the
component to prevent too long or short renewal delay. These limits are set by reasoning that the
preventive maintenance frequency cannot be too high or low. The initial renewal delay is 0.7⋅520
weeks equalling to changing all the working components in 364 weeks. A simulator view of the
control algorithm is presented in Figure 23.
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Figure 23 The simulator view of the PI-control algorithm. Setpoint S is set by adjusting the
target percentage for operating and maintained components (Y).
6.5.13 Analysis of the system behaviour
The system is started from a situation where all the components are new and in the working state
(S0). The controlled variable Y=997. In other words, only three components should be under
repair or waiting for repair. The simulation time is 3120 weeks equalling 60 years.
As shown by Figure 24 the system stabilisation takes almost thirty years. In the beginning
the components are new and no preventive maintenance is needed. However, the number of
deterioration failures increases quickly when the average age of the components increases. This
is compensated with a heavy preventive replacement policy, which causes the average
component ages to drop. The behaviour of the preventive maintenance work start rate starts to
oscillate. The highest amplitudes of the start rate for the preventive maintenance work are cut
because of the limits defined in (19), and because of the shortage of workers for preventive
maintenance. Between week 980 (year 19) and week 1221 (year 23) there are not enough
workers to do the required preventive maintenance. The system seems to be too slow.
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Figure 24 Controlled reliability variable Y, preventive maintenance work start rate, average
lifetime of components and number of idle workers, Gp = 100 and Gi = 2.
It is difficult to make the system fast and stable by adjusting the gains, as shown in Figure 25 in
which the Gp = 50 and Gi = 5 make the system oscillate heavily.
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Figure 25 Controlled reliability variable Y, preventive maintenance work start rate, average
lifetime of components and number of idle workers, Gp = 50 and Gi = 5.
The problem seems to be that a fixed reliability target in this kind of a slow system is very
difficult to achieve. A practical solution is not to try to attain a specific level of reliability but to
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reach for a certain minimum level of reliability. If the minimum level is exceeded, no changes to
the preventive maintenance program should be done. A modification of (18) presented as
)0,min( SYE −= (20)
was used to study this approach. The modification causes any positive error to be ignored.
Consequently, better reliability than the desired level causes no change in the control. The
setpoint of 997 components becomes the minimum reliability target. The resulting renewal delay
and PM work start rates when Gp = 50 and Gi = 5 are presented in Figure 26.
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Figure 26 Controlled reliability variable Y and predictive maintenance work start rate with
modified error equation (20) (Line 1) compared to the original error equation (18) (Line 2), Gp
= 50 and Gi = 5.
There are 997.9 components in operation or under maintenance, which is over the required level.
The system becomes much faster, since the PM program is adjusted in three years, with only
minor oscillation. The drawback is that because (20) ignores positive errors, reduction of the
reliability target does not have any effect on the start rate of the PM maintenance work.
Therefore, in reality, there should be top and bottom allowed limits for the control variable Y.
The oscillation is caused by continuous control towards the desired (optimally efficient)
reliability. Therefore it can be hypothesised that reaching and keeping an optimally efficient
maintenance program with preventive maintenance in slow failure processes is very difficult or
impossible.
As good and realistic as the modified equation (20) seems to be, it is left out from further
analysis and the original equation with Gp = 50 and Gi = 5 is used to amplify the system
behaviour for analysing the system dynamics.
6.5.14 The effect of repair and maintenance repeatability on the system
dynamics
The importance of preventive maintenance and repair repeatability is very high in this kind of a
system. If the maintenance actions are not repeatable, the component states after maintenance
actions are not known. In the simulation a failure in repeatability results in infant failure state
(S5) that cannot be detected by the condition monitoring system.
In the simulation, the reliability is controlled with the help of preventive maintenance, but
the preventive maintenance may not be repeatable, which reduces its effectiveness and increases
infant failures. Poor repair repeatability, in turn, reduces the effectiveness of reactive work and
increases also infant failures. Therefore, poor repeatability of repair and condition-based
maintenance amplify the number of failures and poor repeatability of preventive maintenance
dampens its effectiveness.
The amplification and dampening can be reduced by either increasing the quality of repair
and preventive maintenance or by reducing the number of deterioration failures. The reduction
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of deterioration failures takes place through preventive maintenance, which increases the number
of infant failures. If the quality of repair and preventive maintenance cannot be increased, a
control action out of the system scope, such as better component design, is required.
If the repair and maintenance quality is 100 %, i.e. fully repeatable, the system behaves as
shown in Figure 27. Because the preventive maintenance does not cause infant failures, the
deterioration failures are increased with a slower rate. The preventive maintenance is more
effective and therefore the number of failures decreases more rapidly. Consequently, the
amplification of the system is lower and the system is easier to control. In fact, the system
control does not take into account that there are two failure types: infant failures caused by
maintenance errors and deterioration failures.
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Figure 27 Controlled reliability variable Y, number of repair workers, average lifetime of
components, and number of idle workers with 100 % maintenance and repair quality (Line 1)
compared to 95 % maintenance and 90 % repair quality (Line 2), error equation (18), Gp = 50
and Gi = 5.
6.5.15 The effect of condition monitoring on the system dynamics
The installation of a condition monitoring system shifts a certain proportion of the reactive
maintenance actions to proactive maintenance. Therefore, increasing the diagnostics coverage
reduces failures, which further dampens the amplification caused by poor repeatability of repair.
However, possible false diagnostics alarms cause unnecessary condition-based maintenance
actions. If successful, these actions decrease the average age of the components and therefore
decrease the number of deterioration failures. If unsuccessful, the number of infant failures is
increased. If the increase of the infant failures is lower than the reduction of the deterioration
failures, the false alarms increase reliability. In case of a constant failure rate, no preventive
maintenance can increase reliability. In that case, false diagnostics increases the number of
failures if the maintenance repeatability is not 100 %. If the failure rate is decreasing false
diagnostics increases the number of failures in any case. In other words, perfect condition
monitoring dampens the reliability oscillations caused by imperfect repeatability of the repair
work.
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The effect of 15 % diagnostics coverage without false alarms is shown in Figure 28. The
system oscillation is dampened. Some of the repair workers are moved to condition-based
maintenance and less preventive maintenance is required. Increasing the number of false alarms
up to 20 times the detected failures did not have any other effect than increasing the system
reliability and reducing the average age of the components. A test with a constant failure rate
showed that the reliability was reduced if there were false alarms.
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Figure 28 Controlled reliability variable Y, number of repair workers, average lifetime of
components and number of maintenance workers when diagnostics coverage is 15 % (Line 1)
compared to 0 % diagnostics coverage (Line 2), error equation (18), Gp = 50 and Gi = 5.
6.5.16 The effect of insufficient work resources on the system dynamics
Preventive maintenance controls the reliability. Because preventive maintenance has the lowest
priority of the maintenance work, a sudden increase in deterioration or infant failures may lead
to a shortage of resources in preventive maintenance. In this case, the system controllability is
reduced until the failures have been repaired. Thinking in a systemic sense, this means that the
coupling of preventive maintenance via the deterioration failure process to reactive maintenance
is reversed so that reactive maintenance is coupled to preventive maintenance via a shortage of
work resources.
In Figure 29 there are 35 maintenance workers instead of 30 maintenance workers. The
target reliability is achieved sooner because there are enough maintenance workers, which makes
it possible to do more preventive maintenance work. The reduction rate is the same because the
deterioration failure process defines the dynamics of decreasing reliability.
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Figure 29 Controlled reliability variable Y and preventive maintenance workers when a total of
35 workers (Line 1) are available compared to 30 workers (Line 2), error equation (18), Gp = 50
and Gi = 5.
6.6 SYSTEM MODEL V: A DYNAMIC SPARE PARTS
SUPPLY CHAIN SIMULATION MODEL
6.6.1 Purpose of the model
The model in this chapter was inspired by a rather heuristic methodology described by MacInnes
and Pearce (2002). They propose that the spare parts supply chain should be designed according
to the criticality of the parts as well as their reliability. Because the demand for the spare parts is
initiated by the failures and proactive maintenance of the parts, the demand for these indirect
materials is more difficult to estimate than the direct materials required in the production
process. MacInnes and Pearce (2002) state that no more spare parts should be produced than
what is consumed. Otherwise the materials in the supply chain are buffered, which causes
fluctuations in the inventory levels.
With this model it is possible to study, but not necessarily to predict, what kind of effects
remote condition monitoring could have to the supply chain dynamics. The model extends
beyond the operative maintenance system described so far, and can be seen as a curiosity from
the maintenance system point of view. However, to a machine manufacturer the model may give
an idea of a new and concrete application of remote condition monitoring. The full model is
presented in Appendix E: Model V in Vensim 5.0 text format.
6.6.2 Spare parts demand as a stochastic process
The example case in model III can be used to illustrate the spare parts demand that a single
machine causes to the supply chain. The stochastic model is presented in Appendix D: Model V
consumption analysis in Mathcad 2001i format.
As shown in Figure 30, the spare part demand is much easier to predict when the part is
under preventive maintenance policy. Condition-based maintenance does not change the curve
much from reactive maintenance, because it is the part reliability that defines the form of the
curve. According to Figure 30, preventive maintenance makes the demand for spare parts and
other resources more predictable when there is only one part.
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Figure 30 Probability of spare part demand of reactive (left) and preventive (right) maintenance
policies.
The more there are part usage locations that the supply chain serves, the more evenly and
randomly the failure and maintenance intervals will be distributed. Therefore, it can be assumed
that when there are several part usage locations, the demand interarrival times for a spare part are
exponentially distributed as presented in Figure 31. That is, with many parts operating, failing
and being maintained independently the interarrival times converge to an exponential
distribution with a mean value that equals the mean life time of the parts divided by the number
of the parts  regardless of the applied maintenance policies.
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Figure 31 Analytically calculated exponential demand interval (dotted line) and simulated
demand interval (solid line) in calendar days of 100 parts for 1000 years under condition
monitoring and preventive maintenance. The average failure interval µgroup=30.853 is calculated
from simulation. µgroup ≈ 1/100 ⋅ mean failure or maintenance interval 3070.991 for one part.
The visible error comes from inaccuracy of the numerical simulation.
The inventories use buffering to match the uncertainty in the demand and supply. Therefore, the
interarrival times between the orders that an upper stream inventory sees from each served
downstream inventory can be modelled with a Gamma distribution. The distribution parameters
are defined by the demand that the downstream inventory sees and the order quantity (OQ) that
the downstream inventory uses. With OQ=1, the demand interval follows an exponential
distribution, with OQ>=1 the demand interval follows a Gamma distribution. According to the
central limit theorem with OQ >> 1, the demand interval can be approximated with a normal
distribution, where mean = OQ ⋅ mean of the exponential distribution and standard deviation is
sqrt(OQ) ⋅ mean of the exponential distribution. All these are special cases of a Gamma
distribution.
78
0 200 400 600 800 10000
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
11
0
pgamma
ti
µ group
EOQ,


pi
pnorm ti EOQ µ group⋅, EOQ µ group⋅,( )
10000 ti
Figure 32 The Gamma distribution, simulated and normal distribution of the demand interval
from a downstream inventory that an inventory sees when the downstream inventory buffers its
demand with EOQ = 14 spare parts. µgroup=30.853.
The order quantity is defined by the inventory control strategy of each inventory as well as by
the demand the inventory sees. Because any inventory probably serves several downstream
inventory or part usage locations, it can be assumed that the order interarrival times for orders at
any inventory are exponentially distributed. That is, the order interarrivals follow a Poisson
process.
6.6.3 Modelling supply chains
The model presented in this chapter can be used to study the information sharing of consumption
information to dynamic behaviour of the supply chain. The model is based on the classic
Forrester (1961) industrial supply chain model. The various modelling methodologies and issues
of supply chains have been studied quite extensively (i.e. Angerhofer and Angelides, 2000;
Beamon, 1998). Similar dynamic supply chain models have been developed by Anderson et al.
(2000) for the capital goods industry and by Anderson and Morrice (1999) for the service
business and custom manufacturing. The effect of information sharing on demand variability in
supply chains has been empirically studied by Lee et al. (1997) and quantified by Chen et al.
(2000a, 2000b) with analytical calculations of stochastic behaviour.
Lee et al. (1997) define four reasons for demand variability: demand forecasting errors, order
batching because of inventory optimisation, excess purchases because of quantity discounts, and
preparation for supply shortages. In the models of Chen et. al (2000a, 2000b) the main
variability-causing factors are the demand smoothing time window and the delivery lead time
from order to arrival. Additionally, Chen et al. (2000a) show that demand information sharing
will reduce supply chain variability. According to Forrester (1961), the variability stems from
the system dynamics, which is caused by delays in the information and material flows, as well as
from the management control decisions made according to the available information.
Specifically, in the supply chains, the fluctuation is caused by lead times, safety stocks and the
materials in transit.
The Forrester approach has not been applied in studying the effect of information sharing on
supply chain behaviour prior to this dissertation. Similar simplification and approximation
principles defined in chapter 6.5.3 apply to this model as well. The purpose is not to track the
state of the individual parts but the amount and flows of the parts in the supply chain. It would
have been possible to use some other modelling methodology such as queuing theory (e.g. Taha,
1992), but this would have missed the possibility to model the dynamic behaviour of the system.
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6.6.4 Model overview
The presented model is a simplified version of the Forrester (1961) model. The simplifications
mean that the orders from the downstream inventories to the upstream inventories are transferred
and processed immediately. The delay times are also different from Forrester's model. There
were two reasons for the simplification: firstly, electronic orders have been introduced and taken
into use in industrial supply chains, and secondly, the problem is not to model the effect of the
order processing but the effect of the information provided by remote condition monitoring for
the system. The model parameters are fictive, but not unrealistic, serving the purpose of the
model.
The model was developed and simulated with Vensim PLE v5.01 by Ventana Systems Inc.
A simulator view of model is presented in Figure 33 and a simplified version of the system
model is presented in Figure 34. The system models a supply chain consisting of three levels of
inventories: manufacturer inventory (Level 1), regional distributor inventories (Level 2) and
plant inventories (Level 3).
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Figure 33 The supply chain model as seen in the simulator.
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Figure 34 A simplified view of the supply chain model.
It is assumed in the model that there is an installed base of 90,000 parts. Each part has a failure
type that is prevented or reacted to by replacing the part with a new one. The mean lifetime of
the parts is 3,000 calendar days. Therefore, the parts are replaced at the average rate of 30 parts
per day. The plant inventories store some parts as an insurance stock. The assumption is that the
spare parts are not stocked by the maintenance on the factory floor after taken from the
inventory. If the insurance stock falls below a predefined limit, an order is placed with a regional
parts provider. If the stock of a regional inventory falls below a predefined limit, an order is
placed with the manufacturer. An economic order quantity (EOQ) model (Beyer and Sethi,
1998) or similar is used to determine the inventory levels and order quantities. The manufacturer
inventory uses a similar order quantity strategy to order parts from its production department that
has a maximum production capacity of 37.5 parts / day, which is 25 % more than the average
demand.
Because an inventory must serve very reliably the next level inventories, the inventory level
must be kept high enough to compensate the randomness in supply and consumption to maintain
the required service level. Therefore, there are always more parts in the supply chain than the
average consumption would require. There are also some parts under transportation between the
inventories, which can be seen as a supply pipeline that must be filled or emptied if the average
consumption rate changes. Each inventory notes that there may be random fluctuation in the
orders. Therefore they smooth the number of orders with 3rd order exponential smoothing, that
weights more the recent consumption, to estimate the average demand. The difference between
the desired inventory level and the actual inventory level is corrected after some time, defined by
the average time to accumulate a demand that equals the order quantity (OQ) amount of parts.
This correction time can also be seen as the delay that corrects the difference between the
desired and actual inventory. E.g. a 10-day correction delay corrects the difference at the rate of
10 %/day. The orders are processed immediately and sent to the next level inventory. The
transportation takes some time, which is modelled with 3rd order delay. The inventory target is
modelled with
 det TDKI ⋅⋅= (21)
where K is the safety factor for random fluctuation, De is the estimated demand / day, and Td is
the transportation delay from the upper stream inventory or the delay of the production process.
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The dynamics of the system is defined by the safety factor K=2.5 and by the delays of the
system presented in Table 8.
Delay Length
Level 3 3rd order smoothing delay 21 days
Level 3 inventory correction delay 14 days
Level 2 3rd order smoothing delay 35 days
Level 2 inventory correction delay 28 days
Level 3 3rd order smoothing delay 56 days
Level 3 inventory correction delay 40 days
Production delay, 3rd order 21 days
Transportation delay from level 3 to 2 14 days
Transportation delay from level 2 to 1 7 days
Table 8 System delays.
6.6.5 A study of the system dynamics
The system starts from equilibrium and the dynamics is tested with two input data:
• 5 % (1.5 parts) sudden increase in consumption after 100 days of simulation
• a Poisson consumption process that is approximated according to the central limit theorem
with a normally distributed random daily consumption with a mean of 30 and a variance of
30 parts/day
The system is studied in three modes (Figure 34):
1. in a normal supply chain mode, in which each inventory estimates the average consumption
and operates independently of other inventories
2. in an informed mode in which the installed base of parts is connected via remote condition
monitoring to the manufacturer inventory which uses the real-time consumption information
as the consumption estimate
3. in a fully informed mode in which the installed base of parts is connected via remote
condition monitoring to the manufacturer inventory and the manufacturer shares the
consumption information with the downstream inventories. The plant inventories see the
actual consumption anyway, so there is no need to connect the consumption information to
them.
The input data is the same for all three system modes. The parts are named inventory items in the
simulation.
6.6.6 Step response results in the normal supply chain mode
The consumption rate of the inventory items is 30 until day 100, after which the consumption
increases suddenly to 31.5 items/day. The results are shown in Figure 35.
83
Consumption and Production Rates
35
30
25
2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
1 1 1
1
1
1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0 73 146 219 292 365 438 511 584 657
Time (Day)
Production Rate : 5% Step items/Day1 1 1 1
Consumption Rate : 5% Step items/Day2 2 2 2
 
Inventory Levels
600
300
0
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
2 2
2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
1 1 1
1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0 146 292 438 584 730
Time (Day)
Inventory1 : 5% Step items1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Inventory2 : 5% Step items2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Inventory3 : 5% Step items3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Figure 35 Step responses of the consumption and production rates (left) and the inventory levels
(right).
Level 3 inventories go down until the correction of the inventory levels reaches the new target
inventory levels. Level 2 inventories are reduced because Level 3 inventories order more items
than before to match the increased demand, and also because the number of items in
transportation is increased as well as the safety stocks of Level 3 inventories. The correction of
Level 2 inventories causes too many stocked items at Level 2 because the need to increase the
number of items being transported between Level 2 and Level 3 inventories and the increase of
the safety stocks of Level 3 inventories are satisfied. The overshooting of Level 2 inventories is
then corrected by Level 2 correction. Because of Level 2 safety stocks and the increased
transportation pipeline content between Levels 1 and 2, the undershooting and overshooting of
Level 1 manufacturer inventory is even greater than Level 2 inventories. The manufacturer
production tries to satisfy the inventory levels and adjusts its production rates according to its
inventory targets. In the example case, the 5 % step increase to 31.5 items in the demand rate on
day 100 caused a maximum of 34.719 and a minimum of 30.609 parts to be produced per day as
shown in Table 9.
Day Demand Production Difference
0 30.0 30.000 0 %
100 31.5 30.000 0 %
211 31.5 34.719 10.22 %
290 31.5 30.609 -2.83 %
Table 9 Step response of the production rates in a normal supply chain mode.
The production rate reaches its peak value on day 211, which is 10.22 % higher than the actual
demand. The undershooting happens more than half a year later on day 290 and is 2.83 % less
than the actual demand.
6.6.7 Step response results in the informed and fully informed mode
In an informed mode some, but not necessary the whole population is installed with remote
condition monitoring technology, that detects when a new part is taken into use. The machine
manufacturer estimates the real demand from the consumption information to set the target
inventory level.
The use of consumption information directly in the production planning was tried, but two
problems emerged: Firstly, if the consumption estimate has a systematic error, the production
will always be too high or too low compared to the real consumption. Consequently, this leads to
infinite or zero inventory level at the manufacturer inventory. Secondly, Level 2 and Level 3
inventories order items according to their own policies causing oscillation in the demand even
though the manufacturer knows that the real consumption is not oscillating. Therefore, the
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manufacturer must supply the ordered items and produce a different number of items than the
actual consumption would require.
In an informed mode the demand from Level 2 inventories to Level 1 manufacturer
inventory remains the same, but the manufacturer production is controlled through the inventory
target equation
dat TCKI ⋅⋅= (22)
where Ca is the actual daily consumption received via remote condition monitoring, and Td is the
delay of the production process for the manufacturer inventory. Safety factor K compensates the
random fluctuation and systematic errors in the actual consumption measurement.
Table 10 summarises the effect of connecting the consumption information to Level 3
inventory target calculation. The peak production rate of 33.594 items /day on day 210 is 6.65 %
higher than the actual consumption. The undershooting is only -0.67 %.
Day Demand Production Difference
0 30.0 30.000 0 %
100 31.5 30.000 0 %
210 31.5 33.594 6.65 %
298 31.5 31.290 -0.67 %
Table 10 Step response of the production rates in an informed mode.
In Table 11, the manufacturer shares the consumption information with Level 2 inventories in
order to reduce the oscillation in the demand from Level 2. Level 2 inventories use the available
consumption information in their inventory target calculations similarly to the manufacturer
inventory. Because Level 3 inventories see the consumption directly, the whole supply chain is
fully informed about the real consumption. The overshooting of the production is further reduced
from 6.65 % to 5.82 % on day 210 and the undershooting reduces to -0.33 %.
Day Demand Production Difference
0 30.0 30.000 0 %
100 31.5 30.000 0 %
210 31.5 33.332 5.82 %
310 31.5 31.395 -0.33 %
Table 11 Step response of the production rates in a fully informed mode.
As Figure 36 shows, the main reduction in the oscillation is achieved by connecting the
consumption to the manufacturer inventory. Information sharing with Level 2 inventories
reduces the oscillation slightly further.
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Figure 36 Step response of the production rate in the normal (Line 1), informed (Line 2) and
fully informed (Line 3) modes.
6.6.8 Random data responses in the informed and fully informed modes
A step test does not reveal all the system dynamics, however. To study the real effect of
condition monitoring and information sharing a random consumption with a mean value and
variance of 30 items/day is applied to the three system modes. The consumption data is white
noise as shown in Figure 37.
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Figure 37 Random consumption with 30 items / day as the mean value and variance.
The production rates and inventory levels of each system mode are shown in
Figure 38 and Figure 39. As indicated by the step tests, the fully informed mode is the most
stable in respect to the production rates and the manufacturer inventory levels.
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Figure 38 Production rates in the normal (Line 1), informed (Line 2) and fully informed (Line 3)
mode with the random consumption data.
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Figure 39 Manufacturer inventory levels in the normal (Line 1), informed (Line 2) and fully
informed (Line 3) modes with the random consumption data.
The numerical comparisons are presented in Table 12 and Table 13. Because the sample size is
limited, the average production rates and inventory levels differ from the long-time average
values 30.0 and 375.0.
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Average production rate (items/day) Standard deviation
Normal mode 30.328 3.402
Informed mode 30.332 2.316
Fully informed mode 30.329 2.113
Table 12 Average production rates and standard deviations in the normal, informed and fully
informed modes with the random consumption data for 730 days.
Average inventory level (items) Standard Deviation
Normal mode 370.490 101.130
Informed mode 370.940 75.989
Fully informed mode 371.557 65.182
Table 13 Average manufacturer inventory levels and standard deviations in the normal,
informed and fully informed modes with the random consumption data for 730 days.
The average level of manufacturer inventory in all three modes seems to be too high. The
optimal average inventory level calculated with 99.5 % availability (stdev⋅2.58), and average
capital value calculated with a fictive item value of Eur 25,000 are presented in Table 14. The
results that cannot be seen from the step test are very interesting: the optimal average inventory
level drops to 75.1 % and further to 64.5 % of the optimal values of the normal mode releasing a
maximum capital of Eur 2,318,639 from the inventory. With 15 % own capital cost this would
yield yearly additional savings of Eur 347,795.
Optimal average
inventory level (items)
Average capital value
(Eur)
Proportion of
normal mode
Normal mode 260.916 6,522,909 0 %
Informed mode 196.051 4,901,267 75.1 %
Fully informed mode 168.171 4,204,269 64.5 %
Table 14 Optimal manufacturer inventory levels and capital value in the normal, informed and
fully informed modes
In practice, the reduction of the inventory levels takes place through the reduction of safety
factors K (21) (22) that partly define the variability of the system. Therefore, the reduction of K
reduces the deviations even more than in the presented Table 12 and Table 13. However, Table
14 can be considered as a good approximation of a minimum inventory level reduction.
In summary, the simulation results allow to state that using the real-time material
consumption information received via remote condition monitoring as a demand estimate
reduces the upstream supply chain variability of the maintenance materials.
6.6.9 Further considerations
In the normal mode, reduction of smoothing delays of all the inventories to 21 days from the
original 56, 35 and 21 days reduces the manufacturer inventory standard deviation to 75.090. If
comparing this value to Table 14, it can be seen that the value is less than in the normal and
informed mode with the original smoothing delays. This indicates that too long a delay in
demand averaging may increase the supply chain variability, which is an observation made by
Chen et. al (2000b). In the fully informed mode, the 21 days data smoothing results in a standard
deviation of 40.507 which represents a 53.9 % proportion of the normal mode. The proportional
reduction is higher than in Table 14 with the original smoothing delays. The reason for this is
that the use of real-time consumption information at 1st (manufacturer) and 2nd level inventories
makes it feasible to use shorter smoothing delays, which decreases the supply chain variability.
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In other words, the use of real-time consumption also enables the reduction of the demand
averaging delays, which in turn reduces the variability even more.
If the inventory correction delays are halved, the respective standard deviations for the
manufacturer inventory in the normal mode and the fully informed mode are increased to
206.450 and 104.902. That is, if controlling a slow system too quickly, the system disturbances
will be amplified, which supports the observations of Forrester (1961).
6.6.10 Summary and comparison to the results of other similar studies
Remote condition monitoring can be used for reducing the variability of the spare parts supply
chain. The possible reduction in the inventory levels can be significant, especially if the actual
consumption information is shared with all the inventory levels. Furthermore, the use of real-
time consumption enables the reduction of the demand averaging delays, which also reduces the
supply chain variability. The model results support the findings of Lee et al. (1997), Chen et al.
(2000a, 2000b) and Forrester (1961) specified in chapters 6.6.3 and 6.6.9. The main contribution
of the model is to study the practical idea that remote information acquisition of the spare parts
can be used also for a direct benefit to the machine manufacturer without any maintenance-
related service business between the manufacturer and the machine user. Furthermore, supply
chain optimisation does not require changes in the business strategy of the machine
manufacturer.
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7 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The viewpoint of this research was that of maintenance systems and system control. The effect
of condition monitoring on the maintenance systems was studied by reviewing maintenance and
systems literature, as well as by using conceptual and mathematical models.
Most of the research papers and literature related to this research have been written from the
reliability point of view. That is, the objective has been in modelling and improvement of
machine or production line reliability. Although it is necessary to understand the use of
reliability engineering techniques in order to control the reliability of machines, it is at least
equally important to understand the maintenance systems and their control to efficiently reach
and maintain the required reliability.
Preventive maintenance is feed-forward control and reactive maintenance is feed-back
control. Condition-based maintenance represents neither pure feed-forward nor pure feed-back
control. If the preventive maintenance schedule is changed according to the occurred failures as
in model IV, the maintenance system can be considered an adaptive system with a high-level
feed-back control. Information systems and automatic condition monitoring cannot be applied
efficiently if these fundamental control activities and the information flows of the maintenance
systems are not understood.
The resulting models (I-V) help in understanding what is the effect of information to the
maintenance systems i) by identifying and defining the logical and ordinal relations between
maintenance system objects, ii) by identifying the applicable control methods, iii) by simulating
the detection of failure events of single components and i-iv) by simulating flows of information
and materials in systems consisting of large populations of components.
7.1 SUMMARY OF MAINTENANCE SYSTEMS
CONTROL
Feed-forward control with preventive maintenance assumes that after some usage the risk for
machine failures is high and the machine should be therefore maintained. However, the actual
effectiveness of the maintenance systems can be measured only with the help of the occurred
failures. Paradoxically, not many failures can be observed in an effective maintenance system.
Consequently, the maintenance system efficiency becomes known only in the long run, making
quick control difficult and slow control too slow. Additionally, the uncertainty in the failure and
maintenance system dynamics, and the possible variances in repeatability of the maintenance
actions make the effect of control actions vary and thus reduces reliability. Often, the effects of
preventive maintenance can be seen several years after that maintenance action. Long delays of
failure processes make failure feedback-based adjustments to the preventive maintenance
program uncertain.
Unexpected number of failures causes challenges to maintain the proactive maintenance
program. Fire-fighting breakdowns reduce the possibility to do condition-based and preventive
maintenance. This may cause more failures later. Insufficient worker resources make the
maintenance systems respond more slowly to the needs to increase the proportion of proactive
maintenance.
Also, correct selection of maintenance system efficiency measurement metrics is critical. If
not using total cost of maintenance and failures as the controlled variable the control may
become irrational and favours some maintenance policies more than others.
In summary, slow system dynamics make optimal maintenance system control very difficult.
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7.2 THE EFFECT OF CONDITION MONITORING ON
MAINTENANCE SYSTEMS
Observability defines the key relationship between a machine and a maintenance system.
Without observations it is impossible to say anything about reliability, repeatability, efficiency
or controllability. Therefore, in addition to human perceptions, condition monitoring is the only
way to measure how a maintenance system performs.
Condition-based and preventive maintenance are not mutually exclusive maintenance
policies. Compared to preventive maintenance only, condition-based maintenance may yield
much more efficient maintenance systems. However, condition monitoring is not likely to be
fully accurate or it is too slow compared to all the failure types. Thus, condition-based
maintenance should not always be considered as a replacing, but a complementing policy to
preventive maintenance. Mixing preventive maintenance and condition-based maintenance may
yield the most optimal results.
More speedy reaction to a possible failure increases the proportion of the failures that a
maintenance system can prevent. Therefore, a CMMS and a condition monitoring system may
support each other. However, in reality, a formal maintenance process workflow may be
bypassed in order to execute the condition-based maintenance action in time.
Repairing in a hurry is quite likely more error-prone than well-planned proactive
maintenance. Condition-based maintenance reduces failures and increases the proportion of
proactive maintenance. In theory, this would lead consequently to more sufficient worker
resources and therefore would also increase the controllability of the maintenance system.
The research supported the other studies about the reduction of supply chain variability if
sharing consumption information by using condition monitoring. This represents a novel and
practical idea of linking the component replacement information directly from the machines to
the manufacturer-end of the supply chain. Compared to the other results of the research, this may
turn out as the most valuable short-term application area of the research.
In summary, condition monitoring can be seen as a method for increasing system
observability and therefore an enabler for more effective maintenance systems. However, the
effect of condition monitoring depends on the accuracy of the monitoring and the failure
diagnosis, and is also affected by the failure patterns, the repeatability of maintenance actions
and the delay to arrange the maintenance actions. In spare parts supply chains, remote condition
monitoring can be used to stabilise the supply chain variability and to reduce the supply chain
sensitivity to random noise and sudden changes in the consumption.
7.3 THE ABILITY OF THE SIMULATION MODELS TO
PREDICT MAINTENANCE SYSTEMS BEHAVIOUR
The presented models are based on rough assumptions of the maintenance and failure processes.
Parameterisation of the models with actual data should be done cautiously because the purpose
of the models is not to predict future states of real systems but to describe the behaviour of such
systems. Also, the observability of delays, failure types and frequencies, and the cost data for the
models is in general terms weak.
However, the models should be accurate enough to predict the relative magnitudes and
directions of the maintenance system outputs in regard to the inputs.
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7.4 FUTURE DIRECTIONS AND ISSUES
The developed models form together a foundation for future maintenance information system
development projects. The maintenance system model developed with the knowledge modelling
tool indicate that the logical and ordinal structures of maintenance systems can be captured in the
real life. The quantitative simulation models should be developed further to take into account the
incompleteness of the source data and verified against real observations before applying them in
practice. The quantitative models could be implemented in the knowledge modelling tool to be
used in analysing existing systems or in considering modifications for them. Combination of
real-time condition monitoring and computerised maintenance management system to the tool
would enable model-based real-time control of maintenance systems.
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APPENDIX A: INTERVIEWS
INT
VW
ORGANISATION TITLE DATE SUBJECT
1.1 Metso Paper VP, Research and
Technology
Development
12.3.2002 Maintenance and
reliability of paper
machines
1.2 Metso Paper Development
Manager
12.3.2002 Maintenance of paper
machines
2 Metso Automation Senior VP, Strategy
and Marketing
13.3.2002 Service technologies of an
automation company
3 Metso Minerals VP, Business
Development
18.3.2002 Maintenance and
reliability in mineral
processing machines
4 Metso Field
Systems
Product Manager,
Loop Performance
Solutions
3.4. 2002 Performance tuning
services
5.1 Metso Automation Director, Asset
Management
Solutions
11.4.2002 Service and automation
technologies in paper
machines
5.2 Metso Automation Product Manager,
R&D
11.4.2002 Service and automation
technologies in paper
machines, RCM
6 Metso Paper VP, Partner
Services
10.5.2002 Computerised
maintenance management
and paper machine
maintenance
7 Metso Field
Systems
Product Manager,
Maintenance
Logistics Solutions
3.6.2002 Spare parts services of
industrial valves
8 TietoEnator Product Manager,
PowerMaint
5.6.2002 PowerMaint CMMS
functionality
9 Maxiflex Oy Managing Director,
MRO Software
5.6.2002 Maximo CMMS
functionality
10 Cap Gemini Ernst
& Young
Key Account
Manager,
Manufacturing &
Energy
10.6.2002 Service technologies and
business processes
11 Metso Field
Systems
Director, Field
System Solutions
6.8.2002 Computerized
maintenance systems and
failure requirements
management
12 Artekus Oy Marketing Director 7.8.2002 Arttu CMMS
functionality
13 Metso Field
Systems
Product Specialist 16.8.2002 Valve factory and site
service
14 Metso Field
Systems
Manager,
Maintenance
16.8.2002 Valve factory service
computerised
maintenance management
system
15.1 Metso Field
Systems
Senior Research
Engineer
22.8.2002 Automatic diagnostics
and operating state
identification
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INT
VW
ORGANISATION TITLE DATE SUBJECT
15.2 Metso Field
Systems
Project Engineer 22.8.2002 Automatic diagnostics
and operating state
identification
16 Rissa Consulting
Oy
Principal
Consultant
4.10.2002 Remote monitoring and
service platforms
17 StoraEnso Oyj Mill Maintenance
Manager
30.10.2002 Bearing failure modelling
18.1 Jaakko Pöyry Oy Product Manager,
Automation and
Information
technology
22.11.2002 Plant design model and
structured design
information in diagnostics
18.2 Jaakko Pöyry Oy Design Manager,
Information
technology
22.11.2002 Plant design model and
structured design
information in diagnostics
19 MRO Software Sales Operations
Manager
27.11.2002 CMMS & PDA
productivity
improvements
20 Nero Research Oy Managing Director 13.12.2002 Automatic failure
identification and
diagnostics with neural
networks
21.1 Safematic Oy Control and
Monitoring
Systems, Bearing
Lubrication
Systems
7.1.2003 Reasons to implement
remote diagnostics and
monitoring in industrial
lubrication systems
21.2 Safematic Oy Technical Director,
Lubrication And
Sealing Systems
7.1.2003 Reasons to implement
remote diagnostics and
monitoring in industrial
lubrication systems
21.3 Safematic Oy R & D Co-
ordinator, Bearing
Lubrication
Systems
7.1.2003 Reasons to implement
remote diagnostics and
monitoring in industrial
lubrication systems
21.4 Safematic Oy Product Manager,
Bearing
Lubrication
Systems
7.1.2003 Reasons to implement
remote diagnostics and
monitoring in industrial
lubrication systems
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APPENDIX B: MODEL III IN MATHCAD 2001I
FORMAT
The effect of diagnostics and maintenance on reliability - one failure event type of a
replaceable component (or 100% restoration)
f_weibullrate x β, η,( ) βη
x
η



β 1−
⋅:=
f_weibullcumrate x β, η,( ) xη



β
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f_weibullpdf x β, η,( ) βη
x
η


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⋅ e
x
η

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
β
−
⋅:=
f_weibullcdf x β, η,( ) 1 e
x
η


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β
−
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CDF x β, η,( ) f_weibullcdf x β, η,( ):=
f_weibullicdf pr β, η,( ) qweibull pr β,( ) η⋅:=
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f_η µ β,( ) µ
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f_weibullσ β η,( ) η 2 Γ 1 2β+

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

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2
−:=
f_weibullmedian β η,( ) η ln 2( )
1
β⋅:=
Start with some component (http://www.barringer1.com/wdbase.htm)
β 2.5:=
η 100000:=
MTTF comp
f_weibullµ β η,( )
24
:=
η f_η MTTF comp β,( ):=
η 4166.667=
f_weibullσ β η,( ) 1581.944=
Machine utilization (operating time / calendar time)
Ut 0.8:=
Mean calendar times to repair and maintain, and obtain a machine
MTTR 5:=
MTTM 5:=
MDT 15:= Mean delivery time
Maintenance and repair costs
CCOMPONENTPRICE 10000:=
CREPAIRWORK 2000:=
CMAINTWORK 1000:=
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CMDAILYLOSTCAPACITY 0:=
CDAILYINCOP 0:=
CDAILYINCQUALITY 0:=
CDAILYLOSTCAPACITY 10000:=
CMAINT CCOMPONENTPRICE CMAINTWORK+ CMDAILYLOSTCAPACITY MTTM⋅+:=
CDDAILYINC CDAILYINCOP CDAILYINCQUALITY+ CDAILYLOSTCAPACITY+:=
CREPAIR CCOMPONENTPRICE CREPAIRWORK+ MTTR CDDAILYINC⋅+:=
The cost function of maintenance and repair is
f_cost nmaint nrep,( ) CMAINT nmaint⋅ CREPAIR nrep⋅+:=
The effect of scheduled maintenance on failures
MTBM 2700:= Current maintenance interval (operating time) - Does not include
the repairs of failures!
f_weibullschedrate MTBM x, β, η,( ) βη
mod x MTBM,( )
η

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
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⋅:=
0 5000 1 .104
0
1 .10 4
2 .10 4
3 .10 4
4 .10 4
f_weibullschedrate MTBM x, β, η,( )
x
f_weibullschedcumrate MTBM x, β, η,( )
0
x
xf_weibullschedrate MTBM x, β, η,( )⌠⌡ d:=
f_weibullschedcdf MTBM x, β, η,( ) 1 e f_weibull schedcumrate MTBM x, β, η,( )−−:=
f_weibull schedpdf MTBM x, β, η,( ) x f_weibullschedcdf MTBM x, β, η,( )
d
d
:=
CDF M MTBM x,( ) f_weibullschedcdf MTBM x, β, η,( ):=
β 2.5=
η 4166.667=
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CDFM MTBM t,( )
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The mean operating time to failure (MTTF) of the function from last failure
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MTTF
0
15MTTFcomp
x1 CDFM MTBM x,( )−( )⌠⌡ d:= Set the upper limit to "infinity"
MTTF 8579.109=
MTBM 2700=
MTTF
MTBM
3.177=
The number of maintenances for each failure is given by adding the probabilities that there is 0
maintenances, 1 maintenance 2, maintenances, etc...
NMAINTPERF
0
99
i
CDFM MTBM MTBM i 1+( )⋅,[ ] CDFM MTBM MTBM i⋅,( )−  i⋅∑
=
:=
NMAINTPERF 2.487=
The total calendar time to reach the first repaired failure is given by the number of maintenances
*MTTM+MTTF/Ut+MTTR
1 MTTFR NMAINTMTTM
MTTF
Ut
+ MTTR+
2 NMAINT NREP NMAINTPERF⋅
These intervals, meaning failures, are 365/MTTFR in a year
3 NREP
365
MTTFR
Solving the system 1,2,3 gives
NMAINTPERF MTTM⋅ NREP2⋅ MTTF
Ut
MTTR+

 NREP⋅+ 365− 0
NREP
MTTF
Ut
MTTR+

−
MTTF
Ut
MTTR+


2
4 NMAINTPERF⋅ MTTM⋅ 365⋅++
2 NMAINTPERF⋅ MTTM⋅:=
NMAINT NMAINTPERF NREP⋅:=
NREP 0.034=
NMAINT 0.085=
So the operational availability is
Ao
365 NREP MTTR⋅ NMAINT MTTM⋅+( )−
365
:=
Ao 0.998=
The total costs of maintenance and downtime in a year is therefore:
f_cost NMAINT NREP,( ) 3039.845=
Note that this system is such that the maintenance is executed in intervals MTBM after each
failure or maintenance. That is, the maintenance schedule is not fixed to certain days but to the
MTBM interval.
Simulation
MTBM 2700:=
MTBI 0.1:= Mean operating time between condition monitoring inspections in
days
DTmedian 40:= Median detection time in operation days before failure if the
condition monitoring is continuous. This is defined by the failure
type and CM method.
DTmode 20:= Most often encountered detection time
DTmin 1:= The 10% fractile of all detection times (counting from infinity to
zero!)
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DTmax 50:= The 90% fractile of all detection times (counting from infinity to
zero!)
CINSP 0:= Cost of one inspection
DC 0.75:= Diagnostics coverage % of failures detected
MTTAM 15:= Mean operating time to arrange a maintenance break when a
failure has been diagnosed. This is in fact function of current
machine reliability, the scheduled opportunity as well as availability
of resources.
f_detectionpdf x α, λ,( ) dgamma x λ⋅ α,( ):=
f_detectioncdf x α, λ,( ) pgamma x λ⋅ α,( ):=
f_detection icdf p α, λ,( ) qgamma p α,( )λ:=
LSQ α λ,( )
0
rows t( ) 1−
i
f_detectioncdf ti α, λ,( ) Fi−( )2∑
=
:=
Least Square Method for Curve Fitting
α 1.1:=
λ α 1−
DTmode
:=
Given
α 0>
λ 0>
DTmode λ⋅ 1>
α 1− DTmode λ⋅
Fix the mode value
λ
α


 Minimize LSQ λ, α,( ):=
λ 0.05=
α 2=
Detection density function
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0.5
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:=t
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Detection icdf function - the failure prediction time as a function of probability, if the failure is
predicted at all.
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 10
50
100
f_detectionicdf p α, λ,( )
p
The effect of MTTAM to diagnostics coverage
1 f_detectioncdf MTTAM α, λ,( )−( ) DC⋅ 0.620=
f_detectioncdf MTTAM α, λ,( ) 0.173=
Simulation algorithm
- Simulates events of failures and maintenance actions, st is the maximum simulation time
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f_events st( ) levent_ot 0←
event_ot 0←
events0 2, 0←
i 0←
fail_t f_weibullicdf rnd 1( ) β, η,( ) levent_ot+←
maint_t levent_ot MTBM+←
d f_detectionicdf rnd 1( ) α, λ,( )←
d_t levent_ot← ceil fail_t d− levent_ot−
MTBI


 MTBI⋅ levent_ot+ levent_ot<if
d_t ceil
fail_t d− levent_ot−
MTBI


 MTBI⋅ levent_ot+← otherwise
maintain 0←
event_ot fail_t←
d_t MTTAM+ fail_t≥( )if
maintain 1←
event_ot d_t MTTAM+←
otherwise
rnd 1( ) DC<if
maintain 0←
event_ot fail_t←
otherwise
fail_t maint_t<if
maintain 1←
event_ot maint_t←
otherwise
eventsi 2, levent_ot MTBI+←
break eventsi 2, st>if
levent_ot levent_ot MTBI+←
i i 1+←
event_ot levent_ot− MTBI≥while MTBI 1≥if
break event_ot st>if
eventsi 1 maintain−, event_ot←
levent_ot event_ot←
i i 1+←
0 1<( )while
events
:=
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f_removenulls invector( ) outvector 0 0←
j 0←
outvector j invectori←
j j 1+←
invectori 0>if
i 0 rows invector( ) 1−..∈for
outvector
:=
f_intervals eventlist( ) j 0←
intervals0 0←
intervalsj eventlisti eventlisti 1−−← j 0>if
intervals0 eventlist0← otherwise
j j 1+←
i 0 rows eventlist( ) 1−..∈for
intervals
:=
Simulate 1000000 years of operation time
n 1000000:=
events f_events 365 n⋅( ):=
Failures on the first column, maintenance on 2nd, and inspections on 3rd
eventsT
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
0
1
2
2700 5400 8100 10800 12101.3 14345.9 17045.9
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
=
allevents events 0
〈 〉
events 1
〈 〉+:=
total_ot max events( ):=
allintervals sort f_intervals allevents( )( ):=
Take the intervals between failure and maintenance events
calendarevents calendarevents 0 0, 0←
calendarevents 0 1, 0←
lastDelay MTTM←
tmpEvents
events
Ut
←
calendarevents i 0, tmpEventsi 0, lastDelay+←
lastDelay MTTM←
tmpEventsi 0, 0>if
calendarevents i 1, tmpEventsi 1, lastDelay+←
lastDelay MTTR←
otherwise
i 0 rows events( ) 1−..∈for
calendarevents
:=
allcalendarevents calendarevents0
〈 〉
calendarevents1
〈 〉+:=
allcalendarintervals sort f_intervals allcalendarevents( )( ):=
repairtimes f_removenulls events 1
〈 〉( ):=
repairintervals f_intervals repairtimes( ):=
mainttimes f_removenulls events 0
〈 〉( ):=
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maintintervals f_intervals mainttimes( ):=
All the event intervals, repair intervals and maintenance intervals
allintervalsT 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0 14.529 15 15 15 34.2 39.6 42.3 50.2 54.1 54.3
=
repairintervalsT 0 1 2 3 4 5
0 22208.41 69259.229 24982.227 7982.06 30702.323 516.616
=
maintintervalsT 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0 2700 2700 2700 2700 1301.3 2244.6 2700 2700
=
insptimes f_removenulls events 2
〈 〉( ):=
The need for materials is defined by either maintenance or failures
µ all mean allintervals( ):=
σ all Stdev allintervals( ):=
µall 2457.378=
σall 493.992=
Confidence level 99%
allintervals round rows allintervals( ) 1−( ) 0.99⋅[ ] 2700=
The values of repair and maintenance intervals are as follows
The mean operating time to failure of the function from last failure
µr mean repairintervals( ):=
σ r Stdev repairintervals( ):=
medrep median repairintervals( ):=
µr 22738.489=
σr 22284.381=
medrep 15796.737=
The mean operating time to maintenance of the function from last maintenance
µm mean maintintervals( ):=
σm Stdev maintintervals( ):=
medmaint median maintintervals( ):=
µm 2755.106=
σm 836.778=
medmaint 2700=
Number of repairs and maintenances
NREP rows repairtimes( ):=
NREP 16051=
NMAINT rows mainttimes( ):=
NMAINT 1.325 105×=
NREP NMAINT+ 1.485 105×=
NMAINT
NREP
8.254=
NINSP 0 MTBI 1<if
rows insptimes( ) otherwise
:=
NINSP 0=
i 0 rows repairintervals( ) 1−..:=
t sort repairintervals( ):=
pi
i
rows repairintervals( )
:=
Failure probability function under condition monitoring and maintenance
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0.5
1
CDF ti β, η,( )
pi
ti
The total maintenance costs
TCT
total_ot
Ut
NMAINT MTTM⋅+ NREP MTTR⋅+:=
Total simulated calendar time
TCT 4.57 108×=
NMAINT
NMAINT
TCT
365⋅:=
Number of maintenances in a year
NREP
NREP
TCT
365⋅:=
Number of  repairs in a year
NINSP
NINSP
TCT
365⋅:=
NREP 0.013=
NMAINT 0.106=
NINSP 0=
f_cost nmaint nrep, ninsp,( ) f_cost nmaint nrep,( ) ninsp CINSP⋅+:=
Simulated costs of maintenance
f_cost NMAINT NREP, NINSP,( ) 1958.778=
Operational availability
Ao
365 NREP MTTR⋅ NMAINT MTTM⋅+( )−
365
:=
Ao 0.99837=
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APPENDIX C: MODEL IV IN VENSIM 5.0
TEXT FORMAT
Idle Workers= INTEG (Repair Worker Deallocation
Rate+Maintenance Worker Deallocation
Rate-Repair Worker Allocation Rate-CB
Maintenance Worker Allocation Rate-PM
Worker Allocation Rate, Number Of
Workers)
Number Of Workers= 30
Total Lifetime of Components= INTEG (Components In Operation-
(Necessary CBM Work Start
Rate+Components Failing During Waiting
Rate+PM Work Start Rate+Undetected
Failure Rate+Unnecessary CBM Work
Start Rate)*Average Lifetime of
Components,1)
Failure Rate2= MAX(Working Components To Be CB
Maintained/1000*Statistical Failure
Distribution(Average Lifetime of
Components/Component MTTF),0)
Components In Operation= Components That Fail Soon+Components
that Fail in their Infant Life+Working
Components+Working Components To Be CB
Maintained
Working Components To Be CB Maintained= INTEG (False Diagnostics alarm
Rate-Unnecessary CBM Work Start Rate-
Failure Rate2,0)
Components That Fail Soon= INTEG (Failure Rate+Failure Rate2-
Detected Failure Rate-Undetected
Failure Rate,0)
Difference= Y-Min Percentage of Operating and
Maintained Components*1000
Y= 1000-Components Under Repair-Failed
Components Due to Aging-Failed
Components Due To Infant Failures
Total Failed Components= Failed Components Due To Infant
Failures+Failed Components Due to
Aging
Integral Gain= 5
Integral of Difference= INTEG (Difference,0)
Failures= MAX(Working
Components/1000*Statistical Failure
Distribution(Average Lifetime of
Components/Component
MTTF),0)*(1+STEP(0,2340))
Component MTTF= 520
Repair Quality= Average Repair Quality
Repair Work Start Rate 1= ZIDZ(Failed Components Due to
Aging,Total Failed Components)*Repair
Work Start Rate
Renewal Delay= MAX(MIN(0.7*520+Integral Gain*Integral
of Difference+Difference*Correction
Gain,520),208)
Failed Components Due To Infant Failures= INTEG (Infant Failure Rate-
Repair Work Start Rate 2,0)
Components Under Repair= INTEG (Repair Work Start Rate 1+Repair
Work Start Rate 2-Errorneus Repair
Rate-Quality Repair Rate, 0)
Required PM Start Rate= Working Components/Renewal Delay
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Required Repair Start Rate= Total Failed Components/Administration
Delay of A Worker
Repair Work Start Rate 2= ZIDZ(Failed Components Due To Infant
Failures,Total Failed
Components)*Repair Work Start Rate
Failed Components Due to Aging= INTEG (Undetected Failure
Rate+Components Failing During Waiting
Rate-Repair Work Start Rate 1,0)
False Diagnostics Proportion= 0
Components Under Maintenance= INTEG (Necessary CBM Work Start
Rate+Unnecessary CBM Work Start
Rate+PM Work Start Rate-Quality
Maintenance Rate-Errorneous
Maintenance Rate, 0)
Maintenance Quality= Average Maintenance Quality+Average
Maintenance Quality*Noise
Average Repair Quality= 0.9
Components Failing During Waiting Rate= Failing Components To Be CB
Maintained/(Failure Detection Time-
Average Waiting of CB Components To
Maintenance)
Average Maintenance Quality= 0.95
Noise= 0*0.025* SIN(Time*2*3.14159/Period)+
0*STEP(-0.05, 1560)+0*RANDOM NORMAL(-
0.05, 0.05 , 0, 0.01, 0)
False Diagnostics alarm Rate= False Diagnostics Proportion*Detected
Failure Rate
Average Waiting of CB Components To Maintenance= ZIDZ(Total Waiting
Time of Failing CB Components, Failing
Components To Be CB Maintained)
Failing Components To Be CB Maintained= INTEG (Detected Failure Rate-
Necessary CBM Work Start Rate-
Components Failing During Waiting
Rate, 0)
Total Components To Be CBM= Failing Components To Be CB
Maintained+Working Components To Be CB
Maintained
Unnecessary CBM Work Start Rate= ZIDZ(Working Components To Be CB
Maintained,Total Components To Be
CBM)*CBM Work Start Rate
Working Components= INTEG (Quality Repair Rate+Quality
Maintenance Rate-Failure Rate-PM Work
Start Rate-False Diagnostics alarm
Rate,1000)
Required CB Maintenance Start Rate=Total Components To Be
CBM/Administration Delay of A Worker
Total Waiting Time of Failing CB Components= INTEG (Failing Components
To Be CB Maintained-(Components
Failing During Waiting Rate+Necessary
CBM Work Start Rate)*Average Waiting
of CB Components To Maintenance, 1)
Necessary CBM Work Start Rate= ZIDZ(Failing Components To Be CB
Maintained,Total Components To Be
CBM)* CBM Work Start Rate
Period= 52
Correction Gain= 50
Average Maintenance Time= 4
Min Percentage of Operating and Maintained Components= 0.997
Failure Rate= Failures
Administration Delay of A Worker=1
Available CB Maintenance Start Rate= MAX(Available Repair Start Rate-
Repair Work Start Rate,0)
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Available PM Start Rate= MAX(Available CB Maintenance Start
Rate-CBM Work Start Rate,0)
Available Repair Start Rate= Idle Workers/Worker Allocation Per
Component Failure/Administration Delay
of A Worker
Maintenance Worker Deallocation Rate= Maintenance Workers/Average
Maintenance Time
Average Lifetime of Components= Total Lifetime of
Components/Components In Operation
PM Worker Allocation Rate= PM Work Start Rate*Worker Allocation
Per Maintenance
CBM Work Start Rate= MIN(Available CB Maintenance Start
Rate,Required CB Maintenance Start
Rate)
CB Maintenance Worker Allocation Rate= CBM Work Start Rate*Worker
Allocation Per Maintenance
PM Work Start Rate= MIN(Available PM Start Rate,Required
PM Start Rate)
Repair Workers= INTEG (Repair Worker Allocation Rate-
Repair Worker Deallocation Rate, 0)
Undetected Failure Rate= MAX(Components That Fail Soon*(1-
Diagnostics Coverage)/Failure Time4,0)
Worker Allocation Per Maintenance= 1
Repair Worker Deallocation Rate= Repair Workers/Average Repair Time
Maintenance Workers= INTEG (CB Maintenance Worker
Allocation Rate+PM Worker Allocation
Rate-Maintenance Worker Deallocation
Rate,0)
Repair Work Start Rate= MIN(Available Repair Start
Rate,Required Repair Start Rate)
Repair Worker Allocation Rate= Repair Work Start Rate*Worker
Allocation Per Component Failure
Worker Allocation Per Component Failure= 2
Statistical Failure Distribution ([(0,0)-
(2,40)],(0,0),(0.1,0.001),(0.2,0.01),(
0.3,0.051),(0.4,0.161),(0.5,0.392),
(0.6,0.813),(0.7,1.507),(0.8,2.57),(0.
9,4.117),(0.95,5.111),(1,6.274),(1.1,9
.186),(1.3,17.921),(1.5,31.765))
Failure Detection Time= 8
Average Infant Failure Time=  5
Failure Time4= 12
Average Repair Time= 3
Quality Maintenance Rate= Components Under
Maintenance*Maintenance Quality/Average Maintenance Time
Detected Failure Rate= MAX(Components That Fail
Soon*Diagnostics Coverage/(Failure
Time4-Failure Detection Time ),0)
Diagnostics Coverage= 0
Errorneous Maintenance Rate= Components Under Maintenance*(1-
Maintenance Quality)/Average
Maintenance Time
Errorneus Repair Rate= Components Under Repair*(1-Repair
Quality)/Average Repair Time
Infant Failure Rate= Components that Fail in their Infant
Life/Average Infant Failure Time
Quality Repair Rate= Components Under Repair*Repair
Quality/Average Repair Time
Components that Fail in their Infant Life= INTEG (Errorneous
Maintenance Rate+Errorneus Repair
Rate-Infant Failure Rate, 0)
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APPENDIX D: MODEL V CONSUMPTION
ANALYSIS IN MATHCAD 2001I FORMAT
Materials consumption
mean allcalendarintervals( ) 3071.722=
i 0 rows allcalendarintervals( ) 1−..:=
t sort allcalendarintervals( ):=
pi
i
rows allintervals( )
:=
Component need probability as a function of calendar time
Note that periodic maintenance reduces variance and defines a clear boundary to confidence
levels.
0 2000 4000 60000
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
pi
ti
f_Ficdf pr( ) linterp p t, pr,( ):=  Inverse function for further simulations
0 0.5 10
2000
4000
f_Ficdf x( )
x
Set number of simulated years and number of machines
n 1000:=
nmach 100:=
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f_simt max_t nmach, f_Ficdf,( ) prev_t 0←
i 0←
event_t 0←
event_t prev_t f_Ficdf rnd 1( )( )+←
break max_t event_t≤if
retAi event_t←
prev_t event_t←
i i 1+←
0 1<( )while
prev_t 0←
event_t 0←
k 0 nmach 1−..∈for
sort retA( )
:=
machgroupintervals f_intervals f_simt 365 n⋅ nmach, f_Ficdf,( )( ):=
machgroupintervalsT 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0 339.367 119.386 512.221 28.059 6.716 37.593 419.122 11.186 31.426
=
µgroup mean machgroupintervals( ):=
σgroup stdev machgroupintervals( ):=
µgroup 30.827=
σgroup 32.14=
i 0 rows machgroupintervals( ) 1−..:=
t sort machgroupintervals( ):=
tT 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
=
pi
i
rows machgroupintervals( )
:=
pT 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
0 0 8.446·10    -5 0 0 0 0 0.001
=
Spare parts consumption interval cdf of a machine group
0 50 1000
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
pexp ti
1
µgroup
,


pi
ti
µgroup 30.827=
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With many machines operating, failing and maintained independently the consumption
distribution converges to an exponential distribution with a mean value that equals mean life time
of single machine divided by the number of machines. Number of arrivals with 95% condifdence
level during the delivery time is given by inverse cdf of a poisson distribution. (Homogeneous
Poisson process, HPP) This is the reorder point of the inventory.  (NIST/SEMATECH e-
Handbook of Statistical Methods, http://www.itl.nist.gov/div898/handbook/)
MDT 15=
ROP qpois 0.95
MDT
µgroup
,


:=
ROP 2=
f_EOQ ausage corder, acunit,( ) 2 ausage⋅ corder⋅
acunit
:=
EOQ f_EOQ
365
µgroup
1000, CCOMPONENTPRICE 0.20⋅,


:=
EOQ 3.441=
Buffering the consumption in an inventory, results in a following distribution for the
upstream demand from this inventory:
EOQ 14:=
buff_cons k 0←
buffA0 0←
i 0←
sum 0←
sum sum machgroupintervalsi+←
i i 1+←
buffAreturn i rows machgroupintervals( )if
j 0 EOQ 1−..∈for
buffAk sum←
k k 1+←
1 0>while
:=
buff_consT 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0 2048.875 986.375 339.75 0 0 0 0 1473.651
=
i 0 rows buff_cons( ) 1−..:=
t sort buff_cons( ):=
pi
i
rows buff_cons( )
:=
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EOQ,


pi
pnorm ti EOQ µgroup⋅, EOQ µgroup⋅,( )
ti
Spare parts orders distribution when the real consumption is buffered by EOQ. With EOQ=1, the
consumption follows exponential distribution, with EOQ>=1 the consumpiton follows Gamma
distribution. With EOQ >> 1 the consumption can approximated with normal distribution
(according to the central limit theorem) where mean is EOQ*mean of the exponential distribution
and std. deviation is sqrt(EOQ)*mean of the exponential distribution.
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APPENDIX E: MODEL V IN VENSIM 5.0
TEXT FORMAT
Expected Demand2= SMOOTH3I( IF THEN ELSE(Shared
Information Status=0 :OR:Remote
Monitoring Status=0,Purhasing Plan3,
Remote Monitoring),Averaging
Timeframe2, Average Consumption)
Expected Demand3= SMOOTH3I( Consumption Rate, Averaging
Timeframe3,Average Consumption )
Averaging Timeframe2= 35
Averaging Timeframe3= 21
Consumption Rate= RANDOM NORMAL(0, Average Consumption*6
, Average Consumption, 1*SQRT(Average
Consumption), 0)
Production Rate= DELAY3I(MIN(Production Plan,Max
Capacity),Production Delay, Average
Consumption)
Expected Demand1= SMOOTH3I(IF THEN ELSE(Remote
Monitoring Status=1, Remote
Monitoring, Purhasing Plan2),
Averaging Timeframe1, Average
Consumption)
ShippingRate2to3= DELAY3I(IF THEN ELSE( Inventory2>0
,Purhasing Plan3, 0), Shipping
Delay2to3, Average Consumption)
Shipping Rate1to2= DELAY3I(IF THEN ELSE( Inventory1>0,
Purhasing Plan2, 0), Shipping
Delay1to2, Average Consumption)
Inventory Target1= Expected Demand1*(K*Production Delay)
Average Consumption= 30+0*STEP(1.5,100)
Inventory Correction Delay3= 14
Demand Rate 3= IF THEN ELSE(Inventory3>0,Consumption
Rate,0)
Inventory Correction Delay2= 28
K= 2.5
Inventory Target2= Expected Demand2*(Shipping
Delay1to2*K)
Inventory Target3= Expected Demand3*(Shipping
Delay2to3*K)
Shipping Delay2to3= 7
Inventory3= INTEG (+ShippingRate2to3-Demand Rate
3,Average Consumption*(K*Shipping
Delay2to3-Inventory Correction
Delay3))
Purhasing Plan3= MAX((Inventory Target3-
Inventory3)/Inventory Correction
Delay3,0)
Remote Monitoring= Consumption Rate
Remote Monitoring Status= 0
Production Delay= 21
Production Plan= MAX(Inventory Target1-
Inventory1,0)/Production Correction
Delay1
Purhasing Plan2= MAX((Inventory Target2-
Inventory2)/Inventory Correction
Delay2,0)
Shared Information Status= 0
Shipping Delay1to2= 14
Production Correction Delay1= 40
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Inventory2= INTEG(+Shipping Rate1to2-
ShippingRate2to3, Average
Consumption*(K*Shipping Delay1to2-
Inventory Correction Delay2))
Max Capacity= 37.5
Inventory1= INTEG (Production Rate-Shipping
Rate1to2, Average
Consumption*(K*Production Delay-
Production Correction Delay1))
Averaging Timeframe1= 56
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